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ABSTRACT 
 
 Demand for regionally-produced food has seen tremendous growth in over the last 
decade, amid increasing consumer concerns over food safety, nutrition, origin, production 
practices and quality. Regional food systems provide economic support for small- and 
medium-sized farmers and help consumers become better-informed about their food, 
emphasizing the development of producer-consumer relationships and transparency with 
regard to production practices. In addition to these important social considerations, a 
sustainable and robust regional food system requires efficient and effective supply chain 
operations. However, most existing regional food supply chains (RFSCs) have not 
implemented appropriate supply chain management methodologies, and this has resulted in 
system-wide inefficiencies. Intermediated RFSCs, in which food is delivered to customers 
via a regional distributor, have recently become more prevalent. The role of the distributor, 
or “food hub”, is to provide a platform through which producers can efficiently and 
conveniently connect with customers. The food hub is also often responsible for ensuring 
transparency and facilitating information sharing and communication between producers and 
customers. Therefore, for a successful intermediated RFSC it is essential that the food hub 
manager selects his/her producers properly.   
In this thesis, the impacts of variety of supplier selection policies on regional food 
system are discussed. We discuss what performance metric a RFSC should consider while 
evaluating the farmers. We also discuss the objectives of the food hub and the farmers. The 
food hub managers that we have interviewed have indicated that they do not have formal 
supplier selection policies.  Instead, they randomly select suppliers that they believe will be 
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able to fulfill their current demand. There is very little existing research on how to model the 
problem of supplier selection for regional food systems. In general, however, the literature 
suggests that multi-agent simulation (MAS) is a useful tool for studying supply networks and 
supply chain management methodologies. MAS is an approach to modeling and 
understanding complex systems that are composed of autonomous and interacting agents. 
Because a multi-echelon supply chain is a very complex social system, it is appropriate to use 
MAS to simulate supply chain behavior over time.  Specifically, supply chains that are 
decentralized in command and control (such as RFSCs) are more appropriately captured 
using MAS techniques, rather than more traditional operations research methods. Many 
researchers have described supply chains by their constituent actors, activities, 
interdependencies, goals, and objectives, and they argue that systems possessing these 
components and structures are well-suited to analysis using MAS techniques. To study this 
system, we developed an agent-based model of a theoretical regional food system in 
NetLogo. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
Regional Food 
Food is the source of energy for every human being. It is generally said, good food is 
essential for overall development of human body and mind. That said, it is important to avoid 
waste and loss of good quality food. Jedermann (2014) in his research present how food 
losses which are roughly one-third of food produced for human consumption, of which 15% 
are during distribution of fresh fruits and vegetables (FFVs). Gunasekaran (2001) identifies 
that US industry is wasting $30 billion annually due to poor coordination among supply 
chain partners. Our research is a step towards identifying how this losses can be reduced.  
In Asia, ‘fresh’ food means ‘as close as possible to the consumer’ (Cadilhon 2006).  
There is no specific definition of regionally produced food, however one set of definition is 
essentially based on geography i.e. distance between the consumer and the producer (Jones 
2004). Another definition is described as emotional reach, i.e. based on the consumers’ 
perspective what is local. One more definition as defined by the Alliance for Better Food and 
Farming describes local food as one which meets criteria of embracing not only geographical 
distance but also other specified criteria like environmental safety, animal welfare, proper 
employment, fair trade and cultural conditions (Jones 2004).   
Regional food system is emerging because consumers are becoming aware of the 
vulnerabilities of Industrial food system such as decrease in crop diversity and its 
dependency on fertilizers and pesticides for crop productivity (Stroink 2013). Regionally 
produced food is one of the way of supplying healthier and more nutritious food (Epperson 
1999). Demand for regionally-produced food has increased tremendously in the past decade 
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as consumers have become increasingly aware of the benefits of supporting regional food 
systems. Consumers’ reasons for buying regional food vary widely.  Jones (2004) mentions 
the increase in demand of regionally produce food is due to various reasons like food scarcity 
and increasing consumer concern about food safety. Other typical reasons include: a desire to 
save money on groceries, a belief that regional food is fresher, safer, and/or more nutritious 
than conventionally-produced food, concerns about the environment and the treatment of 
farm workers, and a desire to support the local economy and establish connections with the 
people who produced their food (Brown 2002; Brown 2003; Wolf 2005). This demand 
growth has been a boon to small- and medium-scale farmers, who can benefit from higher 
prices and fewer restrictions on volume, compared with sales through mainstream 
distributors. However, they have also begun to discover that new market and distribution 
channels will be necessary to efficiently and effectively support this demand, while 
continuing to support the values that consumers seek (Krejci and Beamon 2014). In 
particular, many farmers are challenged by a lack of distribution infrastructure which would 
provide them with better access to retail, institutional, and commercial food service markets 
where demand for regional food is substantial (Barham 2012). 
 
Food Hub 
As consumers are looking for various new options to buy FFVs, food hubs are 
emerging as a new regional food system (Stroink 2013). A new novel concept of a regional 
aggregator, or “food hub” has emerged. Food hubs is defined as community based initiative 
to link producers and consumers (Stroink 2013). A food hub provides smaller-scale farmers a 
platform for aggregating their products and distributing them to institutional and retail buyers 
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who would like to buy regional food at larger volumes than traditional farmers’ markets can 
support. By providing a single point of sale, a food hub can reduce farmers’ operational costs 
and enable them to be more profitable. Although their missions, strategies, and structures can 
vary widely, nearly all food hubs offer a combination of production, distribution, and 
marketing services that allows smaller-scale farmers to gain entry into new and additional 
markets that would be difficult or impossible to access on their own (Barham 2012). Food 
hubs also benefit customers by providing them with a single point of purchase for consistent 
and reliable supplies of source-identified products from regional producers. 
Although regional food hubs are a great idea and have become very popular (there are 
currently over 200 food hubs in the U.S.) (Fischer 2013), many of them have struggled to 
make ends meet. Some of the most commonly-cited challenges faced by food hubs are 
insufficient infrastructure for efficient distribution, an inability to successfully match supply 
and demand, and an inability to meet customer requirements for consistent year-round 
volumes and high quality (Goodspeed 2011; Bittner 2011; Vogt 2008; Gregoire 2005). 
Efficiently meeting customer requirements is of particular importance, and food hubs must 
rely heavily upon their suppliers to make this happen. Therefore, a robust supplier selection 
and assessment strategy is critical to food hubs’ long-term success.   
 
Farmer Selection 
There are many studies in the domains of manufacturing and service industries that 
recommend that distributors periodically and systematically evaluate supplier performance in 
order to retain those suppliers who meet their requirements in terms of multiple performance 
criteria that are aligned with the organization’s values and objectives (Mummalaneni 1996). 
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Although there is very little research on the problem of supplier selection and evaluation for 
regional food hubs, it would seem that they should be able to follow the same guidelines as 
those that are recommended for other industries. In reality, however, food hubs tend to use 
ad-hoc heuristics to select and evaluate their farmers (suppliers), and they do not 
systematically track supplier performance over time. A major reason for this is that food hubs 
typically lack the infrastructure, personnel, and financial resources to support a supplier 
management program. However, they also face challenges that are unique to the regional 
food domain. For example, regional food systems are typically supported by a large number 
of small, independent producers who have widely variable objectives, preferences, and 
abilities, and they greatly value their autonomy. Another challenge is that regional food hubs 
are typically motivated not only by traditional supply chain metrics (i.e., maximizing profits), 
but also by social concerns (e.g., supporting regional employment). This concern for overall 
social welfare of regional producers is typically rooted in personal values, a desire to 
maintain a strong and diverse regional supply base, and/or government incentives in support 
of regional economic development. One of the many challenges that food hubs face is 
determining appropriate policies for supplier management that balance these two (often 
conflicting) objectives. For example, food hub managers would like to know how to 
determine the ideal number of producers they should work with for each product type to 
minimize risk, provide customers with sufficient selection, and provide sufficient revenues 
for the producers. These managers also have concerns about developing and managing 
quality assurance policies that satisfy their customers but are not overly burdensome to the 
producers. With per-capita consumption of FFVs continuously rising, and the number of 
small- and medium-sized farmers declining, it is important to address the chronic issue of 
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small- and medium-sized farmers’ sustainability systematically and supplying good quality 
of FFVs. 
 
Multi-Agent Simulation 
As a result, the supplier selection and evaluation problem in regional food systems is 
very complex. Traditional modeling tools are inadequate for the analysis of complex systems 
like food supply networks (North 2007). Multi-agent simulation is a particularly appropriate 
modeling methodology for studying the dynamics among the many autonomous, 
heterogeneous, and interacting agents the regional food chain (Axtell 2000). In this paper, we 
describe a multi-agent simulation model of a regional food supply network, in which farmer 
agents and a food hub agent interact, gather feedback, and adapt accordingly over time. This 
virtual system can be used to test the impact of various supplier selection policies on the 
performance of the system and its structural development over time. 
In this research, we carry forward the work started by Bora and Krejci (2015) to 
develop additional supplier selection policy (contract based supplier selection). This model 
also evaluates the performance metric from all the aspects of supply chain, i.e. delivery 
parameter is added to the evaluation which was missing in the model of Bora and Krejci 
(2015). A sensitivity analysis is performed by changing various parameters like 
transportation cost, weightage on components of performance metric and negotiation success 
rate. This sensitivity analysis will help understand the model as well as the policies in a better 
way and enable the food hub manager to take necessary decisions.  
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Thesis Organization 
 Chapter 2 details the need for such research, the literature review of supply chain, 
supplier selection policies and multi-agent simulation. Then the multi-agent simulation 
model used in the research is described in details. Following the model description, analysis 
of the results of the three policies used in done as per the RFSC parameters. A sensitivity 
analysis is performed by changing various parameters like transportation cost, weightage on 
components of performance metric and negotiation success rate. Chapter 3 provides with 
general conclusions of the study as well as the future direction in this research. 
 
References 
Axtell, Robert. 2000. "Why agents?: on the varied motivations for agent computing in the 
social sciences." Center on Social and Economic Dynamics. Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution. Working Paper 17,. 
Barham, J., Tropp, D., Enterline, K., Farbman, J., Fisk, J., and Kiraly, S.,. 2012. Regional 
food hub resource guide. Washington, DC: US Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Marketing Service. 
Bora, Hardik, and Caroline, Krejci. 2015. "Multi-agent simulation modeling of supplier 
selection for local food systems." Proceedings of the 2015 Industrial and Systems 
Engineering Research Conference. Nashville, Tenn.: ISERC. 
Cadilhon, J. J., Moustier, P., Poole, N. D., Tam, P. T. G., & Fearne, A. P. 2006. "Traditional 
vs. modern food systems? Insights from vegetable supply chains to Ho Chi Minh City 
(Vietnam)." Development Policy Review 24(1), 31-49. 
Epperson, J. E., & Estes, E. A. 1999. "Fruit and vegetable supply-chain management, 
innovations, and competitiveness: cooperative regional research project S-222. ." 
Journal of Food Distribution Research. 30(3), 38-43. 
7 
 
 
Fischer, M., Hamm, M., Pirog, R., Fisk, J., Farbman, J., & Kiraly,S. September 2013. 
Findings of the 2013 National Food Hub. Michigan State University Center for 
Regional Food Systems & The Wallace Center at Winrock International. 
Gunasekaran, A., Patel, C., & Tirtiroglu, E. 2001. "Performance measures and metrics in a 
supply chain environment." International journal of operations & production 
Management. 21(1/2), 71-87. 
Jedermann, R., Nicometo, M., Uysal, I., & Lang, W. 2014. "Reducing food losses by 
intelligent food logistics. ." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 372(2017), 20130302. 
Jones, P., Comfort, D., & Hillier, D. 2004. "A case study of local food and its routes to 
market in the UK. ." British Food Journal, 106(4), 328-335. 
Krejci, C, and B. Beamon. 2014. "Assessing Regional Farm-to-Institution Food Distribution 
Systems: An Agent-Based Approach." Proceedings of the 2014 Industrial and 
Systems Engineering Research Conference. Montreal. 
Mummalaneni, V., Dubas, K. M., & Chao, C. N. 1996. "Chinese purchasing managers' 
preferences and trade-offs in supplier selection and performance evaluation." 
Industrial Marketing Management. 25(2), 115-124. 
North, M. and Macal, C. 2007. Managing Business Complexity: Discovering Strategic 
Solutions with Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation. Oxford University Press. 
Stroink, M. L., & Nelson, C. H. 2013. "Complexity and food hubs: five case studies from 
Northern Ontario. ." Local Environment, 18(5), 620-635. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
ANALYSIS OF SUPPLIER SELECTION POLICIES FOR 
LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS USING AGENT BASED SIMULATION 
 
Abstract 
Demand for regionally-produced food has seen tremendous growth in over the last decade, 
amid increasing consumer concerns over food safety, nutrition, origin, production practices, 
and quality. Regional food systems provide economic support for small- and medium-sized 
farmers and help consumers become better-informed about their food, emphasizing the 
development of producer-consumer relationships and transparency with regard to production 
practices. In addition to these important social considerations, a sustainable and robust 
regional food system requires efficient and effective supply chain operations. However, most 
existing regional food supply chains (RFSCs) have not implemented appropriate supply 
chain management methodologies, and this has resulted in system-wide inefficiencies. 
Intermediated RFSCs, in which food is delivered to customers via a regional distributor, have 
recently become more prevalent. The role of the distributor, or “food hub”, is to provide a 
platform through which producers can efficiently and conveniently connect with customers. 
The food hub is also often responsible for ensuring transparency and facilitating information 
sharing and communication between producers and customers. Therefore, for a successful 
intermediated RFSC it is essential that the food hub manager selects his/her producers 
properly.  However, food hub managers typically indicate that they do not employ formal 
supplier selection policies.  Instead, they randomly select suppliers that they believe will be 
able to fulfill their current demand. 
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. There is very little existing research on how to model the problem of supplier 
selection for regional food systems. The literature suggests that multi-agent simulation 
(MAS) is a useful tool for studying supply networks and supply chain management 
methodologies.  MAS is an approach to modeling and understanding complex systems that 
are composed of autonomous and interacting agents. Because a multi-echelon supply chain is 
a very complex social system, it is advantageous to use MAS to simulate supply chain 
behavior over time.  Specifically, supply chains that are decentralized in command and 
control (such as RFSCs) are more appropriately captured using MAS techniques, rather than 
more traditional mathematical modeling methods. 
This thesis describes the development and application of a multi-agent simulation 
model of a theoretical regional food system intermediated by a food hub to test the impacts of 
three different supplier selection policies on regional food system performance.  Both the 
performance of the individual RFSC members and the overall RFSC performance are 
captured.  Performance is measured with respect to multiple (and sometimes conflicting) 
supply chain metrics, including quality, delivery, price, the relationship between the food hub 
and the supplying farmers, and farm size distribution. The model is also used to determine 
the extent to which each of the three supplier selection policies would help small- and 
medium-sized farmers become more economically sustainable 
 
Introduction 
Demand for regionally-produced food has increased tremendously in the United States over 
the past decade as consumers have become increasingly aware of the benefits of supporting 
regional food systems.  There is no single specific definition of regionally-produced food.  
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However, one typical definition is based on geography, i.e., the distance between the 
consumer and the producer (Jones 2004). Another definition is based on emotional reach, i.e. 
consumers’ perspective on what is local (Jones 2004). Another definition by the Alliance for 
Better Food and Farming describes local food as meeting criteria of embracing not only 
geographical distance but also other specified criteria like environmental safety, animal 
welfare, proper employment, fair trade and cultural conditions (Jones 2004).  In Asia, ‘fresh’ 
food means ‘as close as possible to the consumer’ (Cadilhon 2006).   
Consumers’ reasons for buying regional food vary widely. Consumers are becoming 
aware of the vulnerabilities of the conventional industrial food system, such as decreases in 
crop diversity and a dependency on agrochemicals (i.e., fertilizers and pesticides) for crop 
productivity (Stroink 2013). Regionally-produced food is also perceived as a way of 
supplying healthier and more nutritious food (Epperson 1999).   The increase in demand for 
regionally-produced food also corresponds to consumer concerns regarding food scarcity and 
safety (Jones 2004). Other typical reasons include: a desire to save money on groceries, a 
belief that regional food is fresher than conventionally-produced food, concerns about the 
environment and the treatment of farm workers, and a desire to support the local economy 
and establish connections with the people who produced their food (Brown 2002; C. Brown 
2003; Wolf 2005).  Additionally, roughly one-third of the food produced for human 
consumption food is lost as food waste, partly as a result of long-distance food supply chains 
(Jedermann 2014). US food industry is wasting $30 billion annually due to poor coordination 
among supply chain partners (Gunasekaran 2001). Regionalizing food distribution may help 
to mitigate such losses.  
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This growth in demand for regional food has been a boon to small- and medium-scale 
farmers, who can benefit from higher prices and fewer restrictions on volume, compared with 
sales through mainstream distributors. However, they have also begun to discover that new 
market and distribution channels will be necessary to efficiently and effectively support this 
demand, while continuing to support the values that consumers seek (Krejci and Beamon 
2014). In particular, many farmers are challenged by a lack of adequate distribution 
infrastructure that would provide them with better access to retail, institutional, and 
commercial food service markets where demand for regional food is substantial (Barham 
2012). 
As producers and consumers increasingly seek new and more convenient options for 
selling and purchasing regionally-produced food, a novel concept of a regional aggregator, or 
“food hub”, has emerged. A food hubs is defined as a community-based initiative to link 
producers and consumers (Stroink 2013). A food hub provides smaller-scale farmers a 
platform for aggregating their products and distributing them to institutional and retail buyers 
who would like to buy regional food at larger volumes than traditional farmers’ markets can 
support. By providing a single point of sale, a food hub can reduce farmers’ operational costs 
and enable them to be more profitable. Although their missions, strategies, and structures can 
vary widely, nearly all food hubs offer a combination of production, distribution, and 
marketing services that allows smaller-scale farmers to gain entry into new and additional 
markets that would be difficult or impossible to access on their own (Barham 2012). Food 
hubs also benefit customers by providing them with a single point of purchase for consistent 
and reliable supplies of source-identified products from regional producers. 
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Regional food hubs have significant potential and have become very popular - there 
are currently over 200 food hubs in the U.S. (Fischer 2013). However, most of them have 
struggled to make ends meet. Some of the most commonly-cited challenges faced by food 
hubs are insufficient infrastructure for efficient distribution, an inability to successfully 
match supply and demand, and an inability to meet customer requirements for consistent 
year-round volumes and high quality (Goodspeed 2011; Bittner 2011; Vogt 2008; Gregoire 
2005). Efficiently meeting customer requirements is of particular importance, and food hubs 
must rely heavily upon their suppliers to make this happen. Therefore, a robust supplier 
selection and assessment strategy is critical to food hubs’ long-term success.   
There are many studies in the domains of manufacturing and service industries that 
recommend that distributors periodically and systematically evaluate supplier performance in 
order to retain those suppliers who meet their requirements, in terms of multiple performance 
criteria that are aligned with the organization’s values and objectives (Mummalaneni 1996). 
Although there is very little research on the problem of supplier selection and evaluation for 
regional food hubs, it would seem that they should be able to follow the same guidelines as 
those that are recommended for other industries. In reality, however, food hubs tend to use 
ad-hoc heuristics to select and evaluate their suppliers, and they do not systematically track 
supplier performance over time. A major reason for this is that food hubs typically lack the 
infrastructure, personnel, and financial resources to support a supplier management program. 
They also face challenges that are unique to the regional food domain. For example, regional 
food systems are typically supported by a large number of small, independent producers who 
have widely variable objectives, preferences, and abilities, and they greatly value their 
autonomy.  Another challenge is that regional food hubs are typically motivated not only by 
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traditional supply chain metrics (e.g., maximizing profits), but also by social concerns (e.g., 
supporting regional employment).  This concern for overall social welfare of regional 
producers is typically rooted in personal values, a desire to maintain a strong and diverse 
regional supply base, and/or government incentives in support of regional economic 
development.  One of the many challenges that food hubs face is determining appropriate 
policies for supplier management that balance these two (often conflicting) objectives.  For 
example, food hub managers would like to know how to determine the ideal number of 
producers they should work with for each product type to minimize risk, provide customers 
with sufficient selection, and provide sufficient revenues for the producers.  These managers 
also have concerns about developing and managing quality assurance policies that satisfy 
their customers but are not overly burdensome to the producers. With per-capita consumption 
of regional food continuously rising, and the number of small- and medium-sized farmers 
declining, it is important to systematically address the chronic issue of small- and medium-
sized farmers’ sustainability, as well as the availability of good-quality regionally-produced 
food. 
Thus the supplier selection and evaluation problem in regional food systems is very 
complex.  Traditional modeling tools are inadequate for the analysis of complex 
sociotechnical systems like food supply networks (North 2007). By contrast, multi-agent 
simulation is a particularly appropriate modeling methodology for studying the dynamics 
among the many autonomous, heterogeneous, and interacting agents in the regional food 
chain (Axtell 2000).  In this paper, we describe a multi-agent simulation model of a 
theoretical regional food supply network, in which farmer agents and a food hub agent 
interact, gather feedback, and adapt accordingly over time.  This virtual system can be used 
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to test the impact of various supplier selection policies on the performance of the system and 
its structural development over time.  
This thesis builds on the preliminary work of Bora and Krejci (2015). A multi-agent 
simulation will be described that was developed and used to test the effects of three different 
supplier selection policies on the performance of a regional food system. In the following 
sections, we present the literature review of supply chain, supplier selection policies and 
multi-agent simulation. Then the multi-agent simulation model used in the research is 
described in details. Following the model description, analysis of the results of the three 
policies used in done as per the RFSC parameters. A sensitivity analysis is performed by 
changing various parameters like transportation cost, weightage on components of 
performance metric and negotiation success rate. This sensitivity analysis provides with some 
insights about the model and showcases the robustness of the model. The results are followed 
by conclusions. We expect the results and conclusions will help the food hub managers and 
researchers in RFSC take appropriate measures for the success of local food system. It should 
be noted that regional food and local food are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
Also suppliers, producers and farmers are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
  
Literature Review 
In this section literature review of supply chain and supplier selection policies is presented. A 
literature review of multi-agent simulation is also presented. 
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Supply Chain Management 
Supply chains exist in virtually every industry, including manufacturing, services, and 
distribution. Management of the supply chain is not an easy task, due to the multiple actors 
and activities involved, including procuring raw materials, transforming them into 
intermediate subassemblies and final products, and then delivering these products to the end 
customers (Strader, 1998). A supply chain is a system of suppliers, manufacturers, 
distributors, and customers linked together via two types of flow: 1) feedforward flow of 
materials and 2) feedback flow of information (Towill, 1992). The feedforward flow consists 
of delivering products or service while the feedback flow consists of reviews, payment, and 
reports.  This feedback loop gives insights into the customers’ requirements and values.  
Figure 1 shows a general supply chain structure.   
A supply chain has also been defined as “a network of various autonomous or 
semiautonomous business entities collectively responsible for procurement, manufacturing 
and distribution activities” (Swaminathan, 1998). These entities include the suppliers, 
contractors, buyers, distributors, and retailers who are collectively responsible for supply 
chain activities (Jiao, 2006). The interconnections among these entities make modern supply 
chains complex, and if these interconnections are not properly managed, they can lead to 
suboptimal overall supply chain performance. For example, the “bull-whip effect” can 
significantly increase the amount of inventory that is held across the supply chain because of 
the distortion of information that is passed from one echelon to another via feedback loops 
(Schieritz, 2003).  
The literature suggests multiple strategies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the supply chain (Van der Vorst, 2009). These strategies include redesigning supplier 
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selection policies, reducing lead times, improving delivery methods, creating information 
transparency, and finding ways to coordinate and simplify logistics. However, to understand 
the impacts of such strategies, supply chain performance must be measured. By measuring 
the performance of the supply chain, managers can make appropriate decisions to change 
policies in order to achieve their objectives. Also, measuring supply chain performance gives 
managers a competitive advantage, since they know where they stand. In recent years, many 
firms have realized the potential of effective supply chain management; however, they lack  
 
Figure 1: Supply Chain System 
the necessary insights for the development of effective performance measures and metrics 
(Gunasekaran, 2001). Swaminathan (1998) classifies supply chain performance into two 
broad categories: qualitative and quantitative. Beamon (1998) also supports this classification 
of performance and states that the establishment of appropriate supply chain performance 
measures is critical to their success, by allowing managers to compare competing alternative 
systems and improve the efficiency of the existing systems. Qualitative performance 
measures include customer satisfaction, flexibility, and supplier performance (Beamon, 1998; 
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Swaminathan, 1998). Customer satisfaction depends on quality, cost, delivery, and overall 
responsiveness of the entire supply chain with respect to service and products. Flexibility is 
the degree to which the supply chain can respond to uncertain demand and supply. Supplier 
performance measures the performance of suppliers with respect to quality, cost, delivery and 
relationship or response (i.e., the characteristics of customer satisfaction). Quantitative 
performance measures include supply chain costs, profits, customer response times, and lead 
times. Customer response time is defined as the time taken by the supplier to adapt to 
changes in the demands of the customer. These measures will help to test and reveal various 
strategies for the improvement of the supply chain and to achieve the objectives of the 
constituent firms (Gunasekaran, 2001).  
 
Supplier Selection 
The revolution in supply chain management in the 1990s was driven by changes in 
coordination among suppliers and buyer procurement policies (Strader, 1998). Coordination 
requires communication within and across all supply chain echelons (Malone, 1991). Buyers, 
production managers, suppliers, accounts offices, truck drivers, and operators must all 
coordinate their activities in order for the supply chain to function efficiently and effectively. 
Overall supply chain performance depends upon the performance of the individual suppliers 
and their willingness to coordinate with one another (Swaminathan, 1998). Such coordination 
requires the timely sharing of accurate information among supply chain actors, which is 
generally embedded in all supply chain management programs (Lee H. L., 2000). For 
example, by sharing point-of-sale information with its suppliers, a buyer can help to counter 
the “bullwhip effect”. Other useful information can be shared with suppliers in order to avoid 
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confusion and maintain harmony, including the definition of quality, applicable quality 
standards, and packaging requirements.   
The ability for supply chain actors to effectively coordinate their activities stems from 
procurement activities. Buyer procurement activities include searching for a supplier, 
selecting a supplier, negotiating with the supplier, and completing the transaction, followed 
by feedback or a performance rating. Supplier performance is critical to buyers and enables 
them to use the supply chain for competitive advantage (Krause, 2000). Once the suppliers 
are selected, they have a lasting impact on the competitiveness of the entire supply chain, as 
they tend to remain fixed in long-term buyer-supplier relationships (Choi, 1996). Therefore 
selection and periodic evaluation of suppliers are two of the most significant processes of a 
supply chain system since they define the motives of the buyers and help the buyers evaluate 
current suppliers and potential suppliers (Mummalaneni, 1996). Beamon (1998) classifies 
supplier performance as the consistency of suppliers in terms of quality and delivery. Thus, 
selecting suppliers does not only depend upon low cost, but also a variety of other important 
factors, such as quality, delivery, and location (Mummalaneni, 1996; Swaminathan, 1998; 
Choi, 1996). Different suppliers have different sets of constraints and objectives 
(Swaminathan, 1998). This makes the job of the buyer very difficult, since he has to make 
difficult decisions with respect to tradeoffs between various elements of supplier 
performance. Therefore to make the correct decisions, buyers must monitor supplier 
performance on basis of quality, delivery, cost, flexibility and reputation (Mummalaneni, 
1996). As managers try to improve supply chain performance, it is critical to understand the 
impact of supplier selection policies on the managers’ own organizations, as well as their 
suppliers (Swaminathan, 1998).  
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Supplier Selection Policies 
Supplier selection is a part of the forward and feedback loop shown in Figure 1. However, 
supplier selection itself is also a loop. Figure 2 represents the loop of supplier selection which 
consists of six steps (Hong, 2005). The first step is to search for the suppliers which supply 
the required product. The second step is to shortlist the suppliers with respect to the 
objectives of the purchasing organization and its supplier selection policies. The third step is 
to interact with the suppliers and set the contractual terms. The fourth step is to complete the 
transaction. The fifth step is to evaluate the supplier and the entire procurement process. 
Finally, the sixth step is to give feedback to the suppliers about the procurement process.  
The findings of Choi, et al. (1996) are consistent with those of many other researchers 
in terms of how supplier selection policies should be developed. The authors find through 
their study that: 1) selecting suppliers based on the potential for a long-term relationship is 
very important, 2) price is much less important than quality and delivery metrics, and 3) 
consistency in quality and delivery are  the most important criteria in selecting suppliers. 
They also find that by collaborating with suppliers to better understand the demand and 
improve delivery and product quality, buyers can improve their relationships with suppliers 
and achieve higher customer satisfaction. It is necessary for purchasing managers to have 
policies in place to support the consistent selection of high-performing suppliers in order to 
implement successful supply chain management systems (Choi, 1996). Supplier selection 
policies can help to reduce negotiation time, maintain a consistent set of suppliers, eliminate 
non-value-added costs, and achieve common objectives for an efficient supply chain (Van 
der Vorst, 2009). Once supply chain management policies, including supplier selection, are 
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in place, buyers and suppliers can collaborate in order to achieve individual organization and 
overall supply chain objectives (Choi, 1996). 
 
Figure 2: Process flow of supplier selection 
 
Supplier selection depends upon the evaluation of existing and potential supplier 
performance. There are many studies in the domains of manufacturing and service industries 
that recommend distributors periodically and systematically evaluate suppliers’ performance, 
and this is a common practice in the automotive and electronic industries across the globe 
(Choi, 1996). Performance evaluation ensures that suppliers that consistently meet 
requirements aligned with the values and objectives of the organization are retained. The 
evaluation also helps buyers to remain competitive while selecting suppliers in the future.   
Supplier selection policies should be designed in a way to improve supplier performance and 
capabilities (Krause, 2000).  
The literature on supplier selection includes different frameworks for supplier 
evaluation and performance. For example, Krause (2000) classifies the strategies to evaluate 
supplier performance as internalized or externalized activities. An internalized supplier 
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selection strategy is defined as selecting suppliers in which the buying firm has direct 
involvement or represents a direct investment in terms of production, purchasing capital, or 
process setup. An externalized supplier selection strategy is defined as selecting suppliers 
from the external market and encouraging competitiveness to improve performance. This 
thesis is focused on externalized supplier selection strategies, wherein the buying firm has 
neither direct involvement nor investment in the suppliers and all of the suppliers behave 
autonomously.  
Krause (2000) also classifies selection strategies into three categories.  With a 
competitive pressure strategy, the buying firm applies the competitive force of the market by 
requesting suppliers to bid and select suppliers with low prices.  A supplier assessment 
strategy: involves the buying firm’s evaluation of suppliers’ quality, delivery, cost, 
reliability, and flexibility in order to select a supplier.  With a supplier incentives strategy, the 
buying firm provides incentives for the best performing suppliers and gives them priority or 
assurance of future business. This strategy is designed to motivate the suppliers to 
continuously improve their performance (Krause, 2000). 
Other methods of selecting suppliers are described as data envelopment analysis, 
clustering analysis, and case-based reasoning (De Boer, 2001). However, these methods are 
only used for screening suppliers and not for final selection. Final selection can be done 
using the linear weighting method and the mathematical programming (MP) method (Hong, 
2005). The linear weight method assigns weights to the variables according to their highest 
importance. The main characteristic of this method is that it helps the buyer to identify the 
strengths and weakness of a supplier by comparing them with other suppliers (Hong, 2005).  
The MP method allows the buying firm to formulate a mathematical objective function in 
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order to select suppliers. This model maximizes certain variables (e.g., quality and quantity) 
and minimizes others (e.g., cost and delivery delays) to support supplier selection decisions.  
Another method used during supplier selection is that of fixed contracts. Contracts 
can help buyers to mitigate risks by ensuring regular supply in terms of quality, quantity and 
time, while at the same time helping suppliers earn additional profits (Lee et al, 1999; Van 
der Vorst, 2009).  There are many supply chain contract models, including  quantity 
flexibility (QF), backup agreements, buy back or return policies, and revenue sharing (RS) 
contracts (Giannoccaro, 2004). In QF models the buyer commits to purchase a minimum 
quantity from the suppliers. The backup agreement helps the buyer to reduce risk of demand 
uncertainty by making a backup supply available by paying a certain fixed cost. Under a 
return policy contract, the buyer can return the products to the suppliers if there is insufficient 
demand. Such contracts are possible in merchandise and apparel industries but are rarely seen 
in industries in which the product has a fixed shelf life (e.g., fresh food). Under the RS 
model, the buyer shares a specified amount of profit with its suppliers. This model is similar 
to the supplier incentive strategy. Also the RS and the return policy are similar in the sense 
that both types of contracts realize the potential of the demand (Cachon, 2005). Proper 
contract design can improve profits and performance of the entire supply chain and can act as 
an incentive to suppliers to participate in the supply chain (Giannoccaro, 2004).  
 
Supply Chain Management for Regional Food Supply Chains 
Many researchers have mentioned that food supply chains in general and regional food 
supply chains specifically are not as developed as the supply chain systems of automotive or 
electronic industries (Ahumada, 2009). Thus there is a need for more research on regional 
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food supply chains (RFSCs) in order to make them on par with the state-of-the-art techniques 
that are commonly used in other modern supply chains. One reason that these practices 
cannot always be directly used by RFSCs is that they exclusively focus on buying firms’ 
criteria and ignore the suppliers’ objectives (Choi, 1996). Another reason for difficulties in 
implementing supply chain practices in RFSCs is due to market uncertainties and shorter 
product life (Ahumada, 2009). However, RFSCs have recently gained more attention due to 
the growing demand of regional food, government regulation, public concerns over food they 
consume, and the need for better quality and diverse food (Marsden, 2000). With RFSCs, the 
long and complex structure of industrial food chains is replaced with short 
consumer/producer-oriented and transparent supply chains. The sophistication required to 
compete with the conventional supply chain makes it important for RFSCs to adopt the 
supply chain management techniques that have been successfully implemented in the 
manufacturing sector (Ahumada, 2009). 
However, RFSCs possess unique attributes that make them different from other 
supply chains.  In RFSCs, farmers are very self-directed and do not necessarily buy into 
distributors objectives readily. Food buyers and farmers are equally powerful and sometimes 
have conflicting objectives, which makes the decision making decentralized (Swaminathan, 
1998). This autonomous farmer behavior makes it challenging to model an RFSC. Also, the 
emphasis on quality in the marketing strategies of fresh food and vegetables is enormous in 
RFSCs, compared with other supply chains (Berdegué, 2005; Van der Vorst, 2009). The 
RFSC also redefines producer-consumer relationships to emphasize the importance of trust, 
transparency, and traceability (Marsden, 2000).  
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Research on supplier selection in food supply chains exists in the literature. For 
instance, Hong et al. (2005) developed a mixed integer model to select suppliers in the 
agriculture industry in Korea. Their model had three core characteristics: 1) selected 
suppliers maintained long-term relationship with buyers unless their performance was 
unsatisfactory, 2) suppliers satisfying ideal procurement conditions were selected more often 
and 3) the model was dynamic, meaning that it considered changes occurring in supply and 
procurement policies over time. Berdegué et al. (2005) state that food buyers today are 
shifting their procurement policies from buying from traditional wholesalers and wholesale 
markets to specialized farmers and centralized distribution centers to ensure consistent 
suppliers and a high standard of quality control. Using a systematic supplier selection system 
leads to the implementation of quality standards, thereby improving quality across the food 
supply chain (Berdegué, 2005). In particular, the promise of contracts as a result of supplier 
selection can act as an incentive for farmers to move to larger markets that offer better prices. 
This can help them to improve their quality and invest in quality control (Berdegué, 2005). A 
policy of selecting farmers based on performance has been shown to help to improve overall 
quality in a food supply chain (Bora and Krejci, 2015).  Zheng et al. (2014) claim that 
adopting best practices (e.g., industrial clusters) in RFSCs would help reduce supply chain 
costs. These reductions in supply chain costs may help reduce the high costs of products 
supplied through RFSCs and allow them to be competitive in a market that is dominated by 
conventional food supply chains (Epperson, 1999).  
Marsden et al. (2000) describe three categories of RFSCs: 1) face-to-face, wherein the 
consumer purchases directly from the farmer (e.g., a farmers’ market); 2) spatial proximity, 
where the farmers sell through retail units but only in the local market (e.g., food hubs); and 
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3) spatially extended, wherein the farmers export to different regions. The focus of this thesis 
is on spatial proximity. Figure 3 gives a brief overview of an RFSC that is intermediated by a 
regional food hub. A regional food hub is an aggregator cum distributor of regionally grown 
produce. 
 
Figure 3 : Regional Food Supply Chain (RFSC) System 
Food hub managers often prefer to select small- or medium-sized farmers, often because 
large farmers and wholesalers are unable to meet the specific and strict quality standards of 
regional food consumers (Berdegué, 2005). Selecting a large farmer also makes the food hub 
vulnerable in the negotiation process (Berdegué, 2005).  
Caswell (1998) states that adopting supply chain will not only improve the quality of the 
food but will also reduce waste and transaction costs for farmers, distributors, and customers.  
The adoption of systematic farm-level quality assurance procedures and measures could also 
confer significant marketing advantages and increase consumer confidence in RFSCs 
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(Caswell, 1998). According to Caswell (1998), ensuring quality is easier in RFSCs than it is 
in long conventional food supply chains, and it involves lower transaction costs. 
 
Challenges in Regional Food Supply Chain Management 
The challenges in RFSC management can be classified into two very broad categories: 
quality and procurement and delivery. This section describes the challenges mentioned by 
various researchers in the field of RFSC management. 
Quality and Procurement 
Research in the field of RFSC performance and metrics is rather limited (Bourlakis, 2014). 
There is also very little existing research on RFSC procurement practices and supplier 
selection methods (Hong, 2005).  Supply chain quality assurance is a constant challenge for 
the food hub managers (Ting, 2014; Van der Vorst, 2009). In RFSCs, supplier quality 
performance varies depending upon the practices adopted by the farmer and also on the 
reviews by consumer. The response on quality is quick so it can be incorporated into next 
procurement cycle. Thus there is need for research in procurement and farmer selection in 
RFSC. (Marsden, 2000). 
Bourlakis  et al. (2014) mention that in RFSCs, information that supports traceability, 
trust, and transparency is more important to the consumer than their distance from the farmer 
or the method of product handling. It is this information that demands premium prices and 
also differentiates the RFSC from conventional FSCs. Unlike conventional chains, providing 
information along with the products is the key preposition of RFSCs (King, 2010). Bosona et 
al. (2011) mention that one of the reasons for increasing demand for local food is traceability 
of the source of the food. Brannen et al. (2013) mention that one of the advantages of food 
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hubs and RFSCs is traceability; information about product sourcing and production methods 
is easily tracked. Network integration can helps to increase the quality of local food products 
through improving the traceability of food origin. An integrated traceability system provides 
an added layer of food security (Bantham, 2003). However, the efficiency of product 
traceability depends on information connectivity (Engelseth, 2009). 
Delivery 
Delivery and costs related to transportation and distribution are critical for the economic and 
environmental sustainability of the RFSC (Bourlakis, 2014). Through reduced transport 
distances, RFSCs offer a means of improving food system environmental sustainability, 
which is the focus of existing research (Van der Vorst, 2009). With continuous increases in 
demand and the number of famers involved in RFSCs, supply chain complexities are 
increasing. In such multi-layered complex supply chains, there is a need for structured 
methodology to address challenges in RFSCs (Ting, 2014). It is necessary for farmers to 
follow supply chain best practices to be sustainable in today’s challenging and consumer-
oriented market (Traoré, 1998). Agustina et al. (2014) mention that the biggest challenge for 
RFSCs is to deliver products on time and at a low cost without compromising farmer the 
profits. Norbis et al. (2008) highlight various challenges related to transportation, such as 
capacity shortage, growth in domestic and international sales, empty backhauling, shipment 
size, security concerns, contamination concerns, and environmental and energy concerns, 
suggesting a need for more research on transportation choice.  Gunders et al. (2012) 
summarizes the reasons for food losses during distribution, and attributes it largely to 
improper handling and inconsistent refrigeration; better infrastructure and training is required 
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to avoid such losses. However, Mundler et al. (2012) find that conventional food supply 
chains have a higher rate of energy consumption than the majority of RFSCs.  
Disorganization, a lack of systematic supply chain management structures, and 
numerous false starts and experiments are the reasons for failures of many food hubs 
(Stroink, 2013). There are few state-of-the-art models for RFSC management, and there is a 
need for more research in this area in order for them to be on par with non-food industries 
(Ahumada, 2009). Since today’s RFSCs are relatively new, their logistics experience is still 
being developed, and they have significant room for further performance improvement.  
In order to be successful in RFSC, it is necessary for food hubs to formulate policies 
related to farmer selection (Ahumada, 2009).  Currently, the most preferred tools for supplier 
selection in RFSCs are the coordination methods, although contracting arrangements are also 
gaining popularity. According to Bosona et al. (2011), clustering and logistics network 
integration approaches have shown positive improvements in logistics efficiency, 
environmental impacts, traceability of food quality, and the potential market for local food 
producers. 
  
Modeling Methods for RFSC Management 
Modeling is a way to recreate a real system on the computer and solve the problems of the 
real world (Borshchev, 2004). There are various methods used to model supply chain 
systems, including simulation, which allows for systematic testing (Van der Vorst, 2009; 
Schieritz, 2003). Using simulation is cost-effective and can enable useful investigations and 
system improvement implementations without being confronted with real-world 
consequences (Schieritz, 2003; Towill, 1992).  
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 Computer-based simulations have been commonly used to understand supplier-buyer 
relationships (Giardini, 2008). For example, the AgriPoliS model has been used to model 
agricultural supply chains (Matthews, 2007).  AgriPoliS is an aggregated optimization model 
which is implemented using object-oriented programming languages. System dynamics is 
another tool used by researchers to understand supply chain systems with the help of ordinary 
differential equations (Schieritz, 2003). The drawback of system dynamics is that the 
structure of the supply chain is pre-determined, which is not generally applicable to real 
supply chains and especially to RFSCs (Schieritz, 2003). Towill et al. (1992) advocate using 
industrial dynamic simulation to evaluate the performance of a general supply chain systems. 
A discrete event simulation model, ALADINTM, has been developed and used to perform 
analysis on logistics, sustainability and food quality (Van der Vorst, 2009). However, 
discrete event simulation is mostly used for transportation and logistics rather than analysis 
of quality and sustainability (Van der Vorst, 2009).  
 
Multi-Agent Simulation 
Multi-agent simulation (MAS) is a relatively new method to model systems with agents who 
are autonomous and interact with each other (Macal & North, 2009). MAS models have 
gained popularity because they can: 1) solve complex problems, 2) capture autonomous 
human behaviors and interactions, 3) use stochastic data, and 4) be used to find satisfactory 
solutions (Siebers, 2010). Wooldridge (2009) defines agents as computer systems that are 
capable of independent action. Ferber (1999) in his book on Multi-Agent System defines 
agents as autonomous physical or virtual entities with the skills to achieve their objectives 
that can act, perceive their environment, and communicate with others. MAS encodes the 
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behavior of agents in simple rules so that we can observe the results of these agents’ 
interactions (Wilensky, 2015). An agent performs actions and makes decisions in order to 
achieve its objectives without being explicitly asked to do so.  
However, for an agent to successfully interact with others, it often needs to be able to 
cooperate, coordinate, and negotiate. This ability of agents to interact with each other 
separates MAS from other types of simulation models (Wooldridge, 2009). Axtell (2000) 
reviews the advantages of using MAS over mathematical models. According to him, the 
advantages of MAS are 1) it is easy to describe agents rationally in MAS, 2) it is easy to 
make agents heterogeneous and autonomous in MAS, 3) MAS models can be solved and 
results are obtained by executing it, and 4) it is easy for agents to interact with one another 
through space, networks, or both. However, he mentions the one significant disadvantage of 
MAS is that a single run of a model does not necessarily provide sufficient information. The 
only way to solve this problem is to run the model multiple times.   
Humans are self-directed, autonomous, and social (i.e., they are interdependent and 
interact with other agents), and there is need for models to capture the complexities that arise 
from the interactions among such autonomous entities in supply chain systems (Macal and 
North, 2009). For example, the two agents might interact to negotiate price. If agent A is a 
seller and agent B is a buyer, agent A will tell agent B its price, and if agent B is happy with 
the price offered it will buy the product; otherwise, the negotiation process would be 
executed. In negotiation, agent A may come up with a reduced offer for agent B. Agent B, 
depending upon its level of satisfaction with the offer, may either accept the offer, negotiate 
further, or walk away from the offer. Such types of complex interactions are easier to 
represent in MAS than in mathematical models, since the language and concepts used in 
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MAS is much closer to natural human language and thinking than the equations in 
mathematical models (Wilensky, 2015). In principle, MAS could be reduced to a set of 
differential equations; however, the bottom-up approach and the psychology of the modeler 
differentiate it from other types of models (Fioretti, 2005). 
 
Multi-Agent Simulation Applications 
MAS models have been used in computational economics to study the evolution of 
decentralized market economies (Tesfatsion, 2003). Macal and North (2009) suggest that 
applications of MAS should not be limited to computational economics, but should be widely 
applied in various domains, such as stock markets, supply chains, consumer markets, 
predicting the spread of epidemics, sociology, and biology.  A sample of recent applications 
of MAS modeling is given in Table 1. This list is just a small example that shows the 
diversity of the application of MAS.  
Macal and North (2009) and Siebers et al. (2010) recommend a few features of 
systems that can be readily modeled using MAS. According to them, MAS should be used 
when: 1)  a problem has a natural representation of agents,  2) agents have relationships with 
other agents, 3) agents move or change in time or space, 4)  agents adapt and engage in 
strategic behavior,  5)  emergent behavior is part of the model or is an expected outcome, 6) 
agents have to make decisions. 
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Table 1: Sample of recent multi-agent simulation models and applications (adapted from 
Macal and North (2009))  
 
 
Applications of MAS in Supply Chain Management  
Researchers have recently begun using MAS to model supply chains. Supply chains are 
complex systems with multiple agents, including suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and 
customers, that interact and negotiate with each other over time (Agustina, 2014). This 
behavior of multiple agents makes a strong case for using MAS to model supply chains. 
Schieritz et al. (2003) recommend using MAS to model supply chains due to the number of 
agents involved in interactions using specific decision structures.  
Using MAS, one can evaluate various supply chain management policies without 
affecting real businesses and incurring cost.  MAS has been used to test a model of the 
complex environment of an industrial district (Giardini, 2008). This model enabled the 
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implementation of an artificial environment where agents choose different suppliers based on 
performance evaluations. The model consists of two-way flow: forward flow of materials 
from supplier to buyer, and backward flow of evaluation from buyer to supplier. MAS has 
also been used to study the performance of supplier selection models and shows that it is 
better to buy from fewer suppliers (Valluri, 2005).  Jiao et al.  (2006) used MAS to model a 
multi-contract negotiation system for a global manufacturing supply chain. They also present 
a case of mobile phone global manufacturers using MAS for supply chain coordination.    
Krejci and Beamon (2015) used MAS to study the impacts of the farmer coordination 
on the emergence of different types of RFSC structures over time. Their model captures price 
negotiations between farmer and distributor agents. Bora and Krejci (2015) used MAS to 
develop a model of farmer selection by a food hub manager in a theoretical RFSC. According 
to their results, selecting farmers after ranking them as per their performance is a better 
option than randomly selecting farmers, since the same farmers are retained as suppliers over 
time. This outcome is consistent with other research, which observes that retaining the same 
suppliers enables a firm to achieve sustainable growth (Handrinos, 2014).   
 
Research Question 
This thesis describes the application of MAS to assess the impact of three different supplier 
selection policies on the performance of an RFSC that is intermediated by a regional food 
hub. Both the performance of the individual RFSC members and the overall RFSC 
performance are of interest. Performance is measured with respect to multiple (and 
sometimes conflicting) supply chain metrics, including quality, delivery, price, the 
relationship between the food hub and the supplying farmers, and farm size distribution. The 
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MAS is also used to determine the extent to which each of the three supplier selection 
policies would help small- and medium-sized farmers become more economically 
sustainable. 
 
Methodology 
This section describes a multi-agent simulation (MAS) model of a theoretical regional food 
supply chain (RFSC), which was developed using NetLogo (v. 5.1.0). RFSCs typically 
consist of several different types of actors (i.e., farmers, distributors, and consumers) that 
interact periodically in the forward loop of supplying produce and the backward loop of 
sharing/transferring information. These agents also interact and negotiate with each other to 
describe and attempt to fulfill their requirements. MAS is well-suited to capturing these 
heterogeneous actors, their decisions, and their interactions, as well as the outcomes of these 
decisions and interactions over time. NetLogo is was chosen because of its simple user 
interface and its ability to model complex systems like supply chains over a period of time 
(Tisue 2004). Some other advantages of using NetLogo are (NetLogo User Manual 2014): 
 
 It is freely available 
 It is fully programmable and the syntax is straightforward 
 High speed computation is possible for small numbers of agents (less than 
1000) 
 It contains a large vocabulary of built-in language primitives 
The lengthy process of describing agents, models and sub-models can make them 
cumbersome (Grimm 2006). Thus a standard protocol is helpful when explaining the model. 
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In this section, the guidelines given by the Overview, Design concepts and Details (ODD) 
protocol, as described by Grimm et al. (2006), are followed. The ODD protocol elements are 
described in the following sections.  First, the purpose of the model is described, followed by 
description of the agents used in the model. Then, an overview of the model is presented. 
Finally, each sub-model is described in detail.  
 
Purpose 
The model described in this thesis was developed to address a problem faced by many 
regional food hub managers: an inefficient supply chain. Inefficiencies within RFSCs often 
stem from managers’ inability (or unwillingness) to control farmer performance, in terms of 
cost, quality, and delivery. Food hub managers are keen to understand what policies can be 
put in place to improve RFSC efficiency and how these policies might affect different 
measures of performance. The purpose of this model is to test the impact of different supplier 
selection policies on the objectives of a food hub and the farmers that supply it with food. 
Food hub objectives include providing consumers with high-quality food, ensuring the timely 
deliveries by the farmers, and supporting the social welfare of smaller-scale farmers. Farmer 
objectives include improving profits and maintaining autonomy.  
As previously discussed, supplier performance is typically measured in terms of 
quality, delivery, price, and the relationship between the supplier and the buyer. Depending 
upon the industry in which the supply chain is embedded, the relative importance of these 
parameters may differ. For example, in the automobile industry, quality, delivery, and 
relationships are of utmost importance when selecting suppliers, while cost is relatively 
unimportant (Choi 1996). Therefore, this model is tailored specifically to represent an RFSC, 
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such that the importance of each supplier performance metric reflects the preferences and 
expectations of food hub managers.  In order to assess these preferences, the managers of two 
Iowa food hubs (i.e., the Iowa Food Co-op in Des Moines and the Iowa Valley Food Co-op 
in Cedar Rapids) were interviewed, and their feedback was incorporated into the model.  
Thus the model can be used to assess the impact of explicitly considering supplier 
performance when selecting suppliers in an RFSC.  The ability to test this type of scenario is 
particularly useful for food hub managers, who typically do not employ a systematic method 
of selecting suppliers and may benefit from data-driven supplier selection policies. 
 
Entities and Variables 
A typical RFSC has three echelons – farmers, a distributor, and consumers. The model 
described here is focused on the interactions between the farmers and the regional distributor 
(i.e., the food hub). Therefore, the customers are not explicitly represented as agents. Instead, 
the demand generated by the food hub represents the demand of the customers. In this 
section, the two types of agents that exist in this model are described: 1) farmers and 2) a 
regional food hub manager. The farmer agents produce food and seek market channels for its 
distribution, and the food hub manager purchases food from the farmers to satisfy its 
demand. As shown in Figure 4, the food hub (represented by a bullseye) is located at the 
center of the region, and the farmers (represented by houses) are distributed randomly 
throughout the region. The area of this region is 460 x 460 sq. miles. 
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Figure 4 : Agent representation 
 
Farmer Agents 
The model consists of 100 farmers distributed randomly throughout the region. The 
geographic location of each farmer is assumed to be fixed for all experiments. The distance 
between a farmer and the food hub is calculated as a Euclidean distance (i.e., roads are not 
taken into account). Each farmer is assigned a specific farm size category (small, medium, 
large, or very large), based on its revenues (see Table 2). In this model, the farm sizes are 
distributed as per the U.S. Census of Agriculture, such that 79% of the farms are small, 15% 
are medium, 3% are large, and 3% are very large (USDA 2012). The farmers are randomly 
assigned a revenue value as per their farm sizes; for example, a farmer with a small farm will 
be assigned a revenue value that is between $5,000 and $49,000. In the model, carrots are 
assumed to be the single crop produced and sold. The average price at which the farmers sell 
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carrots is 0.59/lb. (USDA 2012). Using this price and the revenue value of the farmer, the 
total production capacity of the farmer is determined.  
Table 2: Farmer Classification 
Revenues (in $) 
Farmer 
size 
% of farms % sales w 
5000-49999 Small 79 10 2 
50000-249999 Medium 15 23 2 
250000-500000 Large 3 11 4 
500000+ Very large 3 56 4 
 
Total 100 100  
 
 
The farmers are autonomous and work independently to produce food in each time-
step, where one time-step represents a single transaction cycle, which is equivalent to one 
week.  Farmers do not communicate with one another, nor are they capable of observing 
other farmers’ behaviors and outcomes. Farmers’ profits are earned via sales to the food hub 
and/or other customers (e.g., farmers’ markets, mainstream distributors). Since the focus of 
our model is to study the relationships between the farmers and the food hub, the other 
customers are exogenous to the model (i.e., they are not represented as agents). It is assumed 
that the farmers prefer to sell to the food hub because it offers a better prices and more 
efficient transactions than other customers. However, the literature suggests that farmers are 
generally risk-averse (Hildreth 1982). That is, they do not want to put all their eggs in one 
basket. Although the food hub is the preferred market channel, a farmer typically will not sell 
his entire yield to the food hub, in order to maintain his autonomy and not be wholly 
dependent on a single customer for his business. 
The objective of each farmer is to be profitable as well as autonomous (i.e., not 
dependent on a single customer). In order to understand the effects of these conflicting 
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objectives on the farmer agents’ decisions and behaviors, a weighted aggregated utility 
function (U(x)) is assigned to every farmer. The weighted aggregated utility function is an 
exponential function that incorporates the farmer’s preference for increasing profits while at 
the same time mitigating risk (Hildreth 1982). U(x) is the weighted sum of two components: 
the utility the farmer gains by making sales to the food hub (U(x1)) and the utility he gains 
from selling to other customers (U(x2)). U(x1) represents the utility that a farmer gains when 
x1 percent of his total sales are through the food hub, as shown in Equation (1). Similarly, 
U(x2) is the utility that a farmer gains when x2 percent of his total sales are to other customers, 
as shown in Equation (2). x1 and x2 always sum to 100%, based on the assumption that all of a 
farmer’s yield is either sold to the food hub or to other customers. In Equations 1 and 2, 1/R 
represents the farmer’s degree of risk preference and is positive for all farmers (based on the 
assumption that they are risk-averse), where R is the minimum revenue generated by the 
farmer by selling his entire production at the lowest possible price (i.e., $0.59/lb).  
Equation (3) is the weighted aggregated utility function U(x) of the farmer, where w 
is the weight given to the utility of selling to customers other than the food hub, representing 
the relative importance of these customers to the farmer. The weights were derived by 
pairwise comparison as described by (Onut 2009), in which w = 2 represents weak 
importance and w = 4 represents strong importance. In this model, it is assumed that small 
and medium-sized farmers consider customers other than food hub to be relatively less 
important (w = 2), while large and very large farmers consider customers other than food hub 
to be very important (w = 4). For small and medium farmers, the food hub connects them to a 
market with better than average prices, which is otherwise difficult for them to reach; thus 
the food hub is more important than other customers. For large and very large farmers, the 
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conventional customers or the customers other than food hub provide a consistent source of 
demand and can purchase their large volumes of produce. This is the most important reason 
for large and very large farmers to consider customers other than food hub as highly 
important.  
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Food Hub Manager Agent 
In this model there is one food hub located at the center of the region. The main objective of 
the food hub’s manager is to ensure that regionally-produced food of the highest quality is 
supplied to the food hub’s customers. Therefore, quality is a very important component of 
measuring supplier performance.  However, the food hub has several other objectives, and 
these are also reflected via supplier performance metrics.  For instance, since the food hub 
has limited operating manpower, it is important to the manager that the farmers schedule 
their delivery times and adhere to this schedule (Huber 2015). Additionally, as part of its 
social mission, the food hub is strongly motivated to support small- and medium-sized 
farmers (Muldoon 2013). In fact, one of the defining characteristics of a regional food hub is 
its commitment to buy from small- and medium-sized farmers whenever possible (Barham 
2012). Thus the overall value that a given farmer provides the food hub (i.e., the farmer’s 
“performance”) is composed of multiple elements with different degrees of importance to the 
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food hub. The performance metric is described in detail in the “Performance” submodel 
section below.  
 
Model Overview 
In each time-step (i.e., distribution cycle), the food hub manager agent generates demand on 
behalf of its customers. In this model, the demand is uniformly distributed between 24,000 
lbs and 25,000 lbs. Once the demand is generated, the food hub manager will select the 
farmers as per his designated supplier selection policy. The supplier selection policies are 
explained in details in the “Supplier Selection” submodel description below. The farmer will 
continue selecting farmers until the demand is satisfied. Once the demand is satisfied, the 
food hub evaluates each selected farmer as per the performance metric.  
Figure 5 provides an overview of the model. The food hub manager acts as the driver of 
the model. After the farmer and the food hub manager agents are created, the food hub’s 
demand is generated. The food hub manager then starts the process of selecting the farmers 
as per one of three possible supplier selection policies:  
• Policy 1: Random selection of farmers 
• Policy 2: Selection of farmers based on their performance ranking 
• Policy 3: Contracting the top performing farmers  
Once a farmer is selected, the food hub manager and the farmer interact with each other to 
determine whether negotiation is needed. If there is a need for negotiation, the negotiations 
are held. The manner in which negotiations are conducted is described in detail in the 
“Farmer-Food Hub Negotiation” submodel section below. Once the negotiations are 
complete, the farmer is assigned new attribute values (cost, defects, fh_ratio and delivery) as 
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per the negotiated terms. The food hub manager then purchases food from the farmer. If the 
negotiation is unsuccessful, or if there is no need for negotiation, the food hub manager 
purchases the food from the farmer as per the existing terms.  
Once the transaction is complete, the food hub manager once again checks the 
demand. If the demand is not satisfied, the food hub manager now selects a new farmer and 
the process mentioned above is followed. If the demand is satisfied, the process of selecting 
farmers is terminated. The food hub then evaluates the performance of the selected farmers. 
This completes one time-step. For the next time-step, a new demand is generated and the 
cycle is repeated.  
 
Figure 5 : Model Overview 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 describe all the necessary information regarding all the important 
parameters and variables used in the model.  
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Submodels 
This section describes the five submodels that comprise the main model: initialization and 
setup, farmer utility, performance, farmer-food hub negotiations, and supplier selection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Parameter Values 
# Parameter Description 
Possible 
Values 
Source of values 
1 farmer_num Unique identification number of farmer 1-100 - 
2 Xc x-cordinate of the farmer 160 miles Assumption 
3 Yc y-cordinate of the farmer 160 miles Assumption 
4 farm_land Farm land of farmer in acres 
1-2000 
acres 
Assumption 
5 farm_size 
Size of the farmer classified as small, 
medium, large or very large as per the 
farm_land 
small, 
medium, 
large and 
very large 
USDA 
6 distance_origin Distance of the farmer w.r.t food hub 
10 - 225 
miles 
Euclidean 
geometry 
7 coqc Cost of quality control $0.05/lb Assumption 
8 trans Cost of transportation $0.25/mile Experimental 
9 sp_reg Selling price to the other customers $0.59/lb USDA 
10 farm_revenues  Revenue of farmer - USDA 
11 farm_yield Maximum yield of the farmer   USDA 
12 min_farmer_profit 
Calculates the minimum profit a farmer 
would earn under any circumstance 
- Assumption 
13 weight 
Weightage given to the utility of non-food 
hub sales and is size dependent 
2 or 4 Önüt (2009) 
14 utility_value 
Minimum expected utility value of the 
farmers and is size dependent 
0.325, 0.450 
& 0.505  
Wallace Center 
Utility function 
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Table 4: Variable Values 
# Variables Description 
Possible 
Values 
Generation of 
values 
1 sp_pre 
Selling price premium i.e. price at which 
farmers sale to the food hub 
$0.75 - 
$1.25/lb 
Uniform 
distribution 
2 cp_prod 
Production cost incurred to the farmer as 
per USDA 
$0.225 - 
$0.275/lb 
Uniform 
distribution 
3 yield 
% of farm_yield uniformly distributed 
from 80% to 100% 
80-100% 
Uniform 
distribution 
4 farmer_production 
Amount of crop a farmer can produce at a 
given time (units in lb) 
- Model 
5 farmer_utility 
Calculates the utility value of every 
farmer 
0-1 Utility function 
6 fh_ratio 
 % of total farmer_production the farmer 
will sell to food hub 
0-80 Utility function 
7 food_hub_qty 
Amount of quantity farmer will sell to 
food hub 
- Utility function 
8 farmer_selection 
Checks whether farmer is already 
selected 
- 
Supplier selection 
policy 
9 farmer_fh_rev 
Revenues earned by farmer by selling to 
food hub 
- Utility function 
10 farmer_trans_cost 
Transport cost incurred by farmer to 
deliver to food hub 
- Model 
11 farmer_fh_cost 
Production cost of quantity delivered to 
food hub 
- Model 
12 farmer_coqc 
Cost of quality incurred by farmer to 
supply to food hub  
- Model 
13 defects_pr Probability of farmer supplying defects 0-20% 
Uniform 
distribution 
14 farmer_delivery_pr  Probability of farmer delivering 50-100% 
Uniform 
distribution 
15 farmer_fh_profit Profit of the farmer through food hub - Model 
16 farmer_other_qty 
Quantity sold to others other than food 
hub 
- Utility function 
17 farmer_other_rev 
Revenues collected through sales to 
others 
- Utility function 
18 farmer_other_profit Profit through others - Model 
19 farmer_total_profit Total profit of farmer - Model 
20 fh_demand_crop1 Demand for crop1 in lbs 
24000-
25000 lbs 
Uniform 
distribution 
21 
delivery_pr % of farmers who would delivery 25% - 45% Uniform 
distribution 
22 fh_profit Profit of food hub - Model 
23 
total_negotitation Total number of negotiations held 
between the food hub & the farmers 
- Model 
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Initialization and Setup 
At time-step 0, the model is set up. The farmer and the food hub manager agents are created 
and assigned their respective locations, and initial farmer parameter values are assigned.  To 
represent the uncertainty that characterizes crop production, yield values for each farmer 
(farmer_production) are set between 80-100% (uniformly distributed) of the maximum 
possible production. The fh_ratio, which is defined as the percentage of yield that the farmer 
would sell to the food hub, is 20%, 5%, 1% and 1% for small, medium, large and very large 
farmers, respectively. . For example, if fh_ratio is 20% and the yield is 100 lbs, then the 
farmer would sell 20 lbs to the food hub.  The farmer’s production cost (cp_prod) is 
uniformly distributed in the range of $0.225 - $0.275/lb (USDA 2012). The price at which a 
farmer sells his product to the food hub (sp_pre) is uniformly distributed in the range of 
$0.75 - $1.25/lb. sp_pre is higher than sp_reg (i.e., the price at which the farmer sells his 
products to non-food hub customers), which is set to $0.59/lb (USDA 2012)) since it includes 
transportation cost. It is also observed that the farmers sell their products to the food hub at a 
premium price because of better and diverse quality of it produce. The values (i.e., cp_prod 
and sp_pre) vary within their respective range in each time-step. The cost of transportation 
(e.g., for fuel) is as assumed to be $0.25 / mile. The transportation cost for each farmer is 
then calculated by multiplying the Euclidean distance between the farmer and food hub by 
the cost. For non-food hub customers, it is assumed that the buyer will pick up the products 
from the farmer’s location. 
Based on a discussion with the manager of the Iowa Food Co-op, the percentage of 
farmers who schedule their deliveries (delivery_pr) is 25-45% (Huber 2015). Scheduling the 
delivery is essential – it helps the food hub manager to effectively schedule his workforce, 
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thereby improving the efficiency of the supply chain. To represent this in the model, for the 
first five time-steps, 25-45% of farmers are randomly selected as the farmers who schedule 
their deliveries. Farmers who scheduled their delivery at least four times out of five in first 
five time-steps are considered to be highly motivated farmers who can be counted on to 
schedule their deliveries in the future. It is assumed that these highly motivated farmers are 
guaranteed to schedule their deliveries in every time-step for the remainder of the simulation. 
Other farmers are assumed to have 75% chance of scheduling their delivery in any given 
future time-step (farmer_delivery_pr).  The Iowa Food Co-op manager also mentioned that 
the percentage of farmers supplying high-quality products is 90% in each time-step (Huber 
2015). To represent this in the model, 10% of farmers are randomly selected in each of the 
first five time-steps who will supply poor-quality products.  
Once these values are initialized, farmer agents are randomly selected by the food hub 
manager.  Random selection occurs for first five time-steps to initialize the agents in the 
model. Five time-steps is sufficient enough to generate data required to categorize farmers 
according to their quality and delivery patterns.  The conditions are set such that demand is 
greater than supply for the first five time-steps, so that every farmer is selected. At time-step 
5, farmers are classified as being best, average, or poor, with respect to quality. Farmers with 
high prices (prices above 7.5% of expected value of $1.00/lb) and no defects in the first five 
time-steps are considered to be best-quality farmers. Farmers with low prices (prices below 
7.5% of expected value of $1.00/lb) are considered to be poor quality farmers because it is 
assumed that the probability of these farmers supplying poor quality produce is high, 
assuming positive correlation between a product’s price and its quality (Ordonez 1998). All 
other farmers are considered to be average, in terms of quality. After the first five time-steps 
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farmers with best quality have a 5% chance of supplying defective products in any given 
time-step, while farmers with average and poor quality have 10% and 20% chance of 
supplying defects, respectively. Farmers supplying the best quality produce are assumed to 
sell their food at a high price; thus the farmers with high quality would sell their products in 
the range of $1.00 - $1.25/lb.  
Farmer Utility 
After initialization, farmer utility values are calculated as described in Equations (1), (2) and 
(3). Figure 3 represents the utility values U(x) observed with respect to fh_ratio of 0-100% 
for small, medium, large, and very large farmers. Based on an unpublished survey generated 
by the Wallace Center at Winrock International, which stated that  a small farmer would like 
to sell around 63% of its yield to the food hub, while a medium-sized farmer would like to 
sell around 30% of its yield to the food hub, and the large and very large farmers would like 
to sell in the range of 0 – 13%, the threshold values for small, medium, and large and very 
large farmers are set to 0.325, 0.450 and 0.505 respectively (see Figure 6). In Figure 3(a) the 
utility function plot is concave due to the importance of customers other than the food hub, in 
order to maintain sufficient autonomy. The small and medium farmers do not want to be 
completely dependent on the food hub for their sales, i, thus the utility decreases after 
fh_ratio = 60% for small farmers and 40% for medium farmers. Since the profit of small 
farmers is less compare to medium farmer (for example profit of small farmer is $150 while 
that of medium farmer is $600 if both the farmers have fh_ratio = 30%), the small farmer 
needs to sell higher volumes (fh_ratio), to achieve maximum utility to the food hub. For large 
farmers and small farmers, the utility curve is similar (see Figure 3(b)). 
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(a)  
 
(b)  
Figure 6: Utility functions for a) small and medium farmers and b) large and very large 
farmers 
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Performance 
The food hub manager evaluates the performance of each selected farmer at the end of a 
transaction cycle (time-step). The performance of farmers is evaluated on five key 
parameters of the RFSC: 1) food quality (Q), 2) delivery scheduling by the farmers (D), 3) 
food cost (C), 4) farm size (S), and 5) previous performance (A). Table 5 describes the 
weights carried by each parameter. The weights were determined after speaking with the 
food hub managers at the Iowa Food Co-op in Des Moines and the Iowa Valley Food Co-op 
in Cedar Rapids. Total farmer performance (P) is the weighted sum of these five parameters 
(see Equation (4)). 
Table 5: Performance metrics 
 Farmer Performance Parameter Weight 
1 Quality (Q) 35% 
2 Delivery (D) 30% 
3 Cost (C) 15% 
4 Farm Size (S) 10% 
5 Previous Performance (A) 10% 
 Total 100% 
 
 
P = 0.35Q + 0.30D + 0.15C + 0.10S + 0.10A (4) 
 
 Quality in fresh foods is very difficult to define in terms of specifications or standards 
because of their perishable nature, varied consumer tastes, and different consumer 
preferences for nutritional values. However, regional food hubs tend to define quality as 
products having proper packaging and labeling, as well as being fresh and clean (Muldoon 
2013). Because transparency and traceability is so critical in the RFSC (i.e., the customer 
wants to know which farmer produced the food they purchased), having clean and clear 
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labels is very important. Good packaging and clean products show that the farmers are 
serious about quality.  As shown in Table 3, quality (Q) is the most important of the five 
farmer performance components, with a relative weight of 35%. The value of Q = 0 if the 
farmer supplies defective products and Q = 1 if the farmer supplies non-defective products. 
However, delivery (D) is also an important parameter to evaluate a supply chain. 
Delivery scheduling by farmers enables food hub managers to effectively plan their 
resources. Interviews with food hub managers indicate that after quality, delivery is the 
second most important performance component. As shown in Table 5, delivery therefore has 
a weightage of 30%. If the farmer schedules a delivery with the food hub, then the value of D 
= 1; otherwise, D = 0 for that farmer.  
Product cost (C) is relatively unimportant as far as the food hub managers are 
concerned, because most food hubs are driven by the motivation to support small- and 
medium-sized farmers. However, they would like to ensure that the farmers sell their 
products at reasonable prices, which can attract a large customer base. In this model, if the 
unit price of the farmer’s product is more than 10% above the expected selling price 
($1.00/lb), then the value of C = 0; otherwise C = 1. 
As stated earlier, the food hub managers are keen to support small- and medium-sized 
farmers, hence a 10% weightage is given to farmer size (S) in the performance equation. In 
this model, if the farmer is small or medium, then S = 1; if the farmer is large or very large, 
then S = 0. By providing this additional weightage, small and medium farmers get a head 
start in the process of selection when the selection policy is based on performance. Thus the 
performance metric is modified as per the objectives of the food hub to support the social 
welfare of small and medium farmers.   
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Another important supply chain parameter captures the buyer’s relationship with the 
suppliers. The relationship between the farmers and the food hub is defined in terms of the 
length of relationship, reliability, consistency and the quality of the products supplied by the 
farmer. The previous performance helps capture the consistency of farmer’s performance 
over time. The previous performance metric (A) is given a 10% weightage in the 
performance equation. In this model, the values of A range from 0 to 1. For example, if the 
value of A > 0, then the farmer was selected in the previous cycle, where the value of A 
depends upon the performance of the farmer in previous cycle. If the farmer was not selected 
in previous cycle, i.e. there is no record for the farmers performance due to lack of 
consistency, the value of A in such case is 0.  
Based on the maximum possible values of Q, D, C, S, and A, the maximum value of 
P = 1. Since the quality and delivery of farmers may improve over time due to continuous 
negotiations between the farmers and the food hub, the value of P is generally in the range of 
0.7 – 1.0. The median value of P = 0.9, while the mean value of P = 0.8. 
Farmer-Food Hub Negotiations 
Negotiation is the method by which the food hub manager and the farmers interact with each 
other to alter one or more of the initialized values regarding quality, price, and quantity of the 
food that is traded. In this model, the success rate for negotiation is randomly set to 75% (i.e., 
75% of negotiations will be successful). However, a sensitivity analysis was performed to 
analyze the effect that the negotiation success rate has on different supplier selection policies. 
Negotiation can be initiated either by the food hub manager or the farmer. A farmer can 
initiate negotiation either to increase prices or to change the quantity of food sold to the food 
hub (i.e., fh_ratio). The food hub manager can initiate negotiations either to decrease prices 
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or to improve the quality of the farmer’s product (in the case of poor or average quality 
farmers).  
Negotiations for quantity 
Only farmers can initiate this type of negotiation. The farmer will initiate negotiations to 
either increase or decrease the quantity of food that he supplies to the food hub (fh_ratio) if 
the farmer utility is less than the threshold utility value (i.e., farmer_utility < utility_value). 
The increment/decrement (delta) in fh_ratio is by 5%, 2%, 0.1% and 0.1% for small, 
medium, large and very large farmers, respectively. The delta is negative, if the fh_ratio is on 
the higher side. For example in Figure 3(a), for a small farmer, if the farmer_utility is below 
the threshold value (0.325) and fh_ratio is 95% (i.e., the farmer is supplying more volume 
than he would prefer), then the delta will be negative. If the farmer_utilty is below the 
threshold and fh_ratio is 20% (i.e., the farmer is supplying less volume than he would 
prefer), then delta is positive. Every time the farmer initiates this negotiation, the fh_ratio is 
altered by delta.     
Negotiations for cost 
Negotiation for cost can be initiated either by the farmer or the food hub (see Figure 7). The 
food hub will initiate the negotiations to modify cost if the selling price is more than 10% of 
the expected price ($1.00/lb). If the negotiations are successful then the new price (sp_pre) 
will be in the range of $1.00 - $1.15/lb. If negotiations are not successful, the farmer will sell 
the food hub at current price. The farmer will initiate the negotiations to alter the cost if the 
selling price (sp_pre) is less than 10% of the expected price ($1.00/lb). If the negotiations are 
successful then the new price (sp_pre) will be in the range of $0.90 - $1.05/lb. If negotiations 
are not successful, the farmer will sell the food hub at current price. 
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Figure 7: Negotiation for cost 
 
Negotiations for quality 
Only the food hub manager can initiate this type of negotiation. The food hub manager will 
initiate negotiation to improve the quality of a farmer’s products only if the farmer supplies 
defective product. If the farmer is a poor quality farmer, then the food hub will ask him to 
improve from poor to average. If the farmer is an average quality farmer, then the food hub 
will ask him to improve from average to best. For example, if the farmer is in previous time-
step supplied defective products, then the food hub manager will initiate negotiations with 
the farmer to improve quality. If the negotiations are successful, then the farmer upgrades his 
quality to the next level, i.e. from poor quality to average quality or from average quality to 
best quality. There is no scope for improvement if the farmer is already a best quality farmer. 
However, in this case a negotiation still occurs, since it is assumed that the food hub manager 
will give some feedback to the farmer regarding the defects observed.  
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Negotiation is one of the most important aspects in any transaction. It is sometimes 
time consuming and also requires additional manpower. As can be seen from the research by 
(Bora and Krejci 2015), negotiation also act a tradeoff between policies and can help 
improve the performance of the supply chain.  
Supplier Selection 
The most important contribution of this model is to understand how different supplier 
selection policies affect the metrics of an RFSC. As per the objectives of the food hub, the 
most important performance metrics include farmer performance, the percentage of farmer 
yield supplied to the food hub, farm size distribution of selected farmers, number of farmers 
selected, consistency of farmers supplying to the food, and the total number of negotiations 
that occur between the food hub manager and the farmers. The three possible supplier 
selection policies available to the food hub manager in this model are:  
 Policy 1: Random selection of farmers 
 Policy 2: Selection of farmers based on their performance ranking 
 Policy 3: Contracting the top performing farmers  
These policies are varied experimentally to assess their effectiveness with respect to the 
multiple RFSC metrics of interest.  In any given experimental scenario, it is assumed that the 
manager will only follow one of these policies (i.e., he cannot switch back and forth between 
policies).  
Policy 1 
Policy 1 is the random selection of farmers. This is a status quo policy currently used by the 
Iowa food hub managers. In this policy the food hub randomly selects the farmers to satisfy 
its demand in each time-step. 
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Policy 2 
Policy 2 involves selecting the farmers based on their performance ranking. With this policy, 
after evaluating the farmers at the end of a transaction cycle (say time-step t), the food hub 
manager ranks them with respect to their performance. At time-step t+1 the food hub selects 
farmers based on the ranking given at end of time-step t. The farmers are selected by rank 
order until the demand is satisfied. In case of a tie, the tie is broken by selecting the farmer 
randomly.  
Policy 3 
Contracts are essential in order to ensure regular and consistent supply, build relationships, 
reduce the need for negotiations, and promote best practices. Policy 3 involves selecting the 
farmers based on their performance ranking and then contracting with them for a specific 
period of time. With this policy, farmers that have a performance value (P) that is above a 
threshold (experimental value = 97%) during the contract evaluation cycle (i.e., 20 time-
steps) are awarded a contract for 20 time-steps. It is assumed that the farmers will definitely 
accept the offers given by the food hub manager. If the demand is not satisfied by the 
contracted farmers, then non-contracted farmers are selected based on their performance 
ranking (similar to Policy 2). These non-contracted farmers then satisfy the remaining 
demand. After 20 time-steps, again the farmers with performance above the threshold value 
are rewarded with a contract for the next 20 time-steps.  
In Policy 3, contract terms with respect to quality, cost and quantity are fixed (i.e. the 
contracted farmers are assumed to uphold these terms for all 20 time-steps). The farmer 
agrees to consistently provide good quality products. Farmers with farm size small, medium, 
large and very large will maintain an fh_ratio of 0.65, 0.45, 0.10 and 0.10 respectively. The 
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farmers would sell the produce to the food hub in the price range of $1.00 - $1.15/lb. There 
are no negotiations held with the contracted farmers until the contract expires.  
The possibility of the food hub manager or the farmers reneging on a contract is not 
considered, although this is a serious risk in reality. For example, the food hub manager will 
continue to buy from a contracted farmer, even if he supplies defective products, until the 
contract term is over. Additionally, it is assumed that a contracted farmer must sell the 
agreed-upon volume to the food hub in each time-step until the contract term is over, even if 
there is a possibility that the farmer might get a better price from other customers.  
 
Simulation Results and Analysis 
The model was used to run experiments to test the impact of three different supplier selection 
policies on a variety of supply chain metrics.  The three policies for selecting suppliers are as 
follows: 
• Policy 1: Random selection of farmers 
• Policy 2: Selection of farmers based on their performance ranking 
• Policy 3: Contracting the top performing farmers  
The output metrics that were captured for each time-step include: the number of farmers 
selected, the distribution of selected farmer sizes, average selected farmer performance, the 
number of farmers negotiating, the percentage of farmers scheduling delivery, the profit 
made by the food hub, and the volume supplied by the farmers to the food hub by farmer 
size. These metrics were selected because they directly relate to the food hub’s economic and 
social objectives. For each of these policies, 30 replications of 150 time-steps each were run. 
The initial 75 time steps were considered as a warm-up period, to allow the system to 
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stabilize. Therefore, the final 75 of 150 time-steps were considered for evaluating and 
comparing the three policies. One time-step is equivalent to one transaction cycle. (i.e., one 
week). Thus 75 time-steps is equivalent to 75 weeks. 75 weeks (1.5 years) is a sufficient 
amount of time to understand the impact of the policies.  
Table 6 gives a summary of key performance measures evaluated for the three 
policies and their statistical comparison. It is clear that the three policies are quite different 
from each other with respect to these performance measures. A t-test was performed on the 
mean values for each output metric in the final time-step to determine whether the observed 
differences between the three policies were statistically significant (α = 0.05). 
Table 6: Statistical Data of three Policies 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
  Mean  
Std. 
Dev 
Mean  
Std. 
Dev 
Mean  
Std. 
Dev 
Peformance 0.84 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.00 
Negotiation 15.84 0.89 11.43 2.40 6.95 1.36 
% of Farmers 
scheduling delivery 
67.36 2.32 99.60 0.43 93.19 1.57 
% of Quality Issues 9.33 0.44 4.96 0.31 5.05 0.46 
Food hub profit 2922.97 275.02 4125.81 146.55 4166.11 139.88 
fh_ratio* Small 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.64 0.01 
fh_ratio* Medium 0.38 0.01 0.32 0.02 0.45 0.00 
fh_ratio* Large 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
fh_ratio* Very Large 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Total Selected 
Farmers 
52.97 1.15 58.77 7.99 35.96 3.31 
Small farmers 41.58 1.09 43.58 8.54 29.90 3.28 
Medium farmers 8.13 0.16 11.75 1.22 5.81 0.77 
Large Farmers 1.64 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.14 
Very large Farmers 1.62 0.08 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.32 
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Table 7: Statistical Comparison of Policies 
  Policy 1 vs Policy 2 Policy 1 vs Policy 3 Policy 2 vs Policy 3 
  
p-
value 
Conclusion 
p-
value 
Conclusion 
p-
value 
Conclusion 
Peformance 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.09 Similar 
Negotiation 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
% of Farmers 
scheduling 
delivery 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
% of Quality 
Issues 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.19 Similar 
Food hub profit 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.15 Similar 
fh_ratio* Small 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
fh_ratio* 
Medium 
0.00 
Policy 1 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
fh_ratio* Large 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.03 
Policy 3 is 
better 
fh_ratio* Very 
Large 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.44 Similar 
Total Selected 
Farmers 
0.22 Similar 0.00 
Policy 1 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
Small farmers 0.29 Similar 0.00 
Policy 1 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
Medium farmers 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 1 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
Large Farmers 0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.08 Similar 
Very large 
Farmers 
0.00 
Policy 2 is 
better 
0.00 
Policy 3 is 
better 
0.38 Similar 
 
 
 
Model Validation – Policy 1 as status-quo 
According to a survey prepared by Wallace Center at Winrock International, currently small 
farmers supply 39% of their total yield to a food hub. As per Policy 1 in the simulation, the 
small farmers on average supply 34% of their volume to the food hub (fh_ratio = 0.34). 
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These values are nearly the same. Also, the data published by Fischer (2013) states that 
around 70% of food hubs have fewer than 70 producers, and 54% of food hubs have fewer 
than 40 producers. On average, the number of producers doing business with a food hub in 
any given transaction cycle is 80. As per Policy 1, the mean number of farmers supplying to 
the food hub in the final time-step of the simulation is 52.90, which falls into the real-world 
range. Generally food hubs work with a large range of farmers (Fischer, 2013). This is 
because the food hubs want to have diverse types of products. According to Policy 1, 94% of 
selected producers are either small or medium-size. As per the USDA (2012), 94% of the 
farmers who sell to the retail store and food hubs are either small or medium-sized. 
Therefore, Policy 1 is consistent with the current situation in the real world.  
 
Policy Comparison  
From the Table 7, it is clear that Policy 2 and Policy 3 are much better than Policy 1 with 
respect to all of the supply chain metrics These results suggest that food hub managers 
should seriously consider adopting one of these two policies to guide their farmer selection 
process.  
Performance and Quality 
The average farmer performance under Policy 1 is significantly lower than Policies 2 and 3, 
as can been seen from Figure 8. This is because the producers are randomly selected to 
satisfy the consumer demand. There are no controls in place to ensure quality of the products. 
In Policies 2 and 3, producers are selected on the basis of their performance, and as a result, 
supply chain performance improves over time. This can also be observed from the fact that 
the Policy 1 has significantly more total quality issues (4.93) on average than policies 2 
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(2.78) and 3 (1.85). According to Huber (2015), in any given transaction cycle, 
approximately 7-10% of farmers will supply defective items. As per Policy 1, it is observed 
that about 9.5% of farmers on average are supplying defective products. Policies 2 and 3 
result in 5.2% and 4.9% of farmers supplying non-conforming products, respectively, as can 
be seen in Figure 9. The variability observed in Figure 9 for quality defects is due to 
stochastic nature farmer’s quality. Huber (2015) mentions that it is very difficult to predict 
which farmer, how many farmers and when would these farmers supply defective produce. 
The graph in Figure 9, reciprocates this stochastic behavior in the model. 
Delivery Scheduling 
According to Policy 1, the average percentage of farmers scheduling their delivery is 67%. 
This is comparatively higher than the initial input values for the model, which range from 25-
45%. This is because over time the food hub manager interacts and negotiates with farmers to 
start scheduling. However, they are unable to achieve 100% farmer scheduling. It is 
important to note here that real-life food hub managers find it very difficult to ask farmers to 
schedule their deliveries, even though delivery scheduling could greatly benefit food hub 
operations (Huber, 2015). For Policies 2 and 3, the percentage of farmers scheduling 
deliveries is significantly higher, as can be seen in Figure 10. In Policy 2, this number is 
almost 100%. The incentive of getting selected if the farmer starts scheduling can be clearly 
observed in this policy. In Policy 3 the percentage of farmers scheduling is 93%. This value 
is significantly lower than that observed in Policy 2, although it is significantly greater than 
Policy 1.  It seems that once the farmer is contracted for a term, there may be a possibility 
that he would occasionally not adhere to the contract terms, and the food hub has very little 
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recourse. This is one of the trade-offs between Policy 2 and Policy 3, which the food hub 
manager should keep in his mind while making a decision to select a particular policy. 
 
 
Figure 8: Performance Comparison 
 
 
Figure 9: Quality Issues 
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Figure 10: Delivery Scheduling 
Negotiations 
Figure 11 shows the percentage of farmers the food hub conducts negotiations with in each 
time-step. It can be observed that Policies 2 and 3 require comparatively fewer negotiations 
than policy 1. However, in Policy 3 there are spikes observed, with negotiations ranging to 
110% of farmers. For example, at time-step 60, the percentage of farmers negotiating is 
104% (i.e., 29 farmers held negotiations with the food hub but only 28 were successful and 
selected). The contract term of farmers is 20 time-steps. Thus a spike in negotiations is 
observed for Policy 3 after each 20-time-step contract period. Except for the periodic renewal 
of contracts the percentage of farmers negotiating is within the range of 0 – 27% in Policy 3. 
For Policy 2, the percentage of farmers negotiating ranges from 6 – 35%, while for policy 1 
this range is from 14 – 45%.  
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Figure 11: Negotiations 
Farmer Size Distribution 
One of the major objectives of the food hub is to support and promote small and mid-sized 
farmers. It is of special interest to the food hub managers to understand how the policies will 
help them achieve their objective of supporting small and medium farmers. Figure 12 shows 
that for Policy 1, the food hub on an average selects 78% small farmers, 15% mid-sized 
farmers and 3% large and very large farmers. This trend is similar to observed by the USDA 
(2012). The food hub managers want to develop policies which will support their objective of 
selecting as many as small and medium-sized farmers possible. Policy 2 and Policy 3 are a 
step in that direction. In Policy 2, the share of large and very large farmers is transferred to 
medium-size farmers. In Policy 3, the share of large and very large farmers is transferred to 
small farmers. As can be seen from Table 6, there is no significant difference (i.e. p-value > 
0.05) between total number of farmers selected by the Policy 1 or Policy 2. However there is 
a significant difference between total number of farmers selected by Policy 3 and Policies 1 
and 2. Thus we can conclude that the contractual policy plays an important role in 
determining the total number of participating farmers. 
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Figure 12: Farmer Distribution 
Farmer Sales 
One of the objective of the food hub is to improve the sales of its farmers. An unpublished 
survey conducted by the Wallace Center at Winrock International states that the small 
producers sell 39% of their total yield by volume to a food hub. However, these small 
producers would like to increase this value to 63% (as mentioned Table 8). Policies 1 and 2 
enable the small farmers to sell up to 34% and 38% on average to the food hub. However, 
with Policy 3 the small farmers can sell up to 65% of their yield to the food hub. The medium 
sized farmer’s sale on average 38%, 32% and 45% to the food hub as per the Policy 1, Policy 
2 and Policy 3 respectively and can be observed in Figure 13. The increase in sales of 
farmers in Policy 3 is specifically due to contractual conditions. The contractual terms of 
policy 3 enables farmers to sell a pre fixed quantity of produce to the food hub. 
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Table 8 : Producer Sales to Food hub 
 
Survey by Wallace Center at 
Winrock International 
Simulation Results 
 
Farm 
Size 
Current 
fh_ratio 
Expected 
fh_ratio 
Policy 1 
fh_ratio 
Policy 2 
fh_ratio 
Policy 3 
fh_ratio 
Small 39% 63% 34% 36% 64% 
Medium 13% 30% 38% 32% 45% 
Large 
& Very 
Large 
8% 13% 8% 1% 2% 
Sample 
Size 
93 farmers 85 farmers 100 farmers 
100 
farmers 
100 
farmers 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Producer Sales 
Food Hub Profit 
For any business to be sustainable it must generate sufficient profit. Food hub generally 
receives 20% of the total sales as their revenues (Huber, 2015). In this model, we consider in 
case the consumer receives defective produce, the food hub will refund the amount to the 
customer (loss). Thus the profit is difference between the revenues and the loss. As Figure 14 
shows, the average food hub profit under Policies 2 and 3 is approximately 35% higher than 
under Policy 1.  Some of this profit could be shared among the farmers, or it could be used to 
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reward better performing farmers. Rewarding suppliers with incentives is a common practice 
in manufacturing industries (Cachon, 2005). The incentives can be in the form money, fixed 
contracts, preferred supplier or higher prices. This practice may motivate the farmers to 
improve their performance and thus improving the entire supply chain and the quality of the 
produce. In this model, the incentives are in terms of fixed contracts (Policy 3). 
 
Figure 14: Food Hub Profit 
Overall, Policies 2 and 3 outperform Policy 1 for almost every supply chain metric and food 
hub objective. These results suggest that food hub managers would greatly benefit from 
shifting from their status-quo of the Policy 1 to either Policy 2 or Policy 3. Policies 2 and 3 
are have quite similar results for some metrics but differ with respect to the number of small 
farmers and medium farmers selected, the percentage of the yield supplied by small and 
medium sized farmers, the number of negotiations between the food hub and the farmers, and 
the percentage of farmers scheduling the delivery, as can be seen in Table 6. Out of the eight 
parameters for which the two policies differ, each policy has an advantage over the other for 
67 
 
 
four parameters. Therefore, the food hub manager would have to consider other factors (e.g., 
cost of negotiations, cost of administering contracts) when choosing between these two 
policies.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is critical to understand how robust the model is. It also gives insights 
into the performance of the RFSC when input parameter values are changed. In the model, 
the following parameters were changed one at a time and the resulting impacts on RFSC 
metrics were analyzed: 
1. SA 1) Transportation Cost: $0.50/mile 
2. SA 2) Weights on performance metric: Q = 35, D = 30, C = 25, S = 0, A = 10 
3. SA 3) Weights on performance metric: Q = 20, D = 20, C = 35, S = 05, A = 20 
4. SA 4) Negotiation success rate = 100% 
5. SA 5) Negotiation success rate = 50% 
6. SA 6) Changing contract length in Policy 3: Contract length = 30 
The data and values used for the analysis are tabulated in Appendix A. 
SA 1) Transportation Cost 
The motivation to perform sensitivity analysis by changing the transportation cost was to 
understand how important the transportation cost is, in terms of sustainability of the system.  
This is extremely important for real-life farmers and food hubs, because fuel costs can vary 
widely over time.  
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SA 2) Weights on farmer performance components 
The original model considers farm size while rating the performance of the farmer. However, 
the impacts on the RFSC if size of the farmer was not considered were not known. To 
analyze this, the weightage on the size of the farmer was set to 0. The new weights are then: 
Q = 35, D = 30, C = 25, S = 0, A = 10. 
SA 3) Weights on farmer performance components 
Both the literature and interviews with food hub managers clearly indicate that cost is the 
least important parameter with respect to RFSC performance. However it critical to consider 
the effects of cost on robustness of the system. The effects of a large increase in the weight 
on cost were of interest. The new weights are: Q = 20, D = 20, C = 35, S = 05, A = 20. 
SA 4) Negotiation success rate  
As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to predict if the negotiation will be successful or not. 
The original model has the negotiation success rate set at 75%, but the effects of having a 
guaranteed 100% success rate were of interest. 
SA 5) Negotiation success rate  
In this analysis, the negotiation success rate is reduced to 50%.  
SA 6) Changing contract length in Policy 3 
In this analysis, the contract length for Policy 3 is changed from time-steps = 20 to time-steps 
= 30. 30 time-steps is approximately 7 months.  
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Analysis  
In the following sections, I discuss the sensitivity analysis performed on the three policies. 
Food hub profit. 
As Figure 15 shows, the food hub’s profit does not show any significant changes with the 
changes in parameters. This is because the food hub’s profit is highly dependent on demand. 
However, in the original model, Policy 2 results in slightly higher profits (see Figure 15). In 
all other model set ups, Policy 3 yields slightly higher profits. However, the difference is 
statistically insignificant in all cases.  
 
Figure 15: Food hub profit Sensitivity Analysis 
Delivery 
Figure 16 shows that none of the sensitivity analyses significantly affected average delivery 
performance. 
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Performance 
Figure 17 shows that the average farmer performance value is not affected by any of the 
parameter value changes that were part of the sensitivity analysis. 
Negotiation 
The sensitivity analysis showed significant impacts on the average total number of 
negotiations conducted. As can be observed in Figure 18, increasing the transportation cost 
(SA 1) causes the average number of negotiations to increase for all the policies. The number 
of negotiation is significantly high for Policy 2. The number of negotiations increases when 
transportation cost is increased because the smaller farmers end up negotiating with the food 
hub more frequently to increase their sales (fh_ratio).  When the success rate of negotiation is 
decreased to 50% (SA 5), there is an increase in the average required number of negotiations; 
however, it is not statistically significant. 
Defects 
The number of defects supplied by the farmers does not change significantly in any of the 
policies except for Policy 1, when the negotiation success rate is 50% (SA 5 in Figure 19). 
This is because successful negotiation is key to reduce the defects (Bora and Krejci, 2015). 
fh_ratio 
The percentage of sales by volume to the food hub (fh_ratio) does not change significantly 
for medium farmers for any of the sensitivity analysis scenarios. However, the small farmers 
are sensitive only to a change in transportation cost. This can be observed in Figure 20. As 
the transportation cost increases, the small-sized farmers want to sell more of their yield to 
the food hub in order to compensate for the expenses incurred due to the increase in  
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Figure 16: Delivery Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Figure 17: Performance Sensitivity Analysis 
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Figure 18: Negotiation Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Figure 19: Defects Sensitivity Analysis 
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transportation cost. Large and very large farmers sell more to the food hub in Policy 2 and 
Policy 3 compared to the original model when the performance metric is altered so that  the 
weightage on the size of farmers is low (in SA 2, S = 0% and in SA 3, S = 5%). Thus, giving 
a 10% weightage in the original model plays a significant role in reducing the volumes 
offered by large and very large farmers.  
  
  
Figure 20: fh_ratio sensitivity analysis 
Farmer Size Distribution 
The greatest impacts of the sensitivity analysis were observed for the farmer size distribution 
metric. An increase in transportation cost does not affect the large and very large farmers; 
however, it significantly affects the number of small and medium sized farmers that are 
selected by the food hub manager (see Figure 21). With an increase in transportation cost, the 
number of small and medium sized farmers decrease. When changes are made to the weights 
of the performance metric, the number of large and very large farmers getting selected 
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increases. This change is significantly observed in Policy 2 and Policy 3. Increasing the 
negotiation success rate to 100% decreases the number of farmers selected; however, it is not 
statistically significant. Decreasing the negotiation success rate to 50% increases the number 
of farmers selected in Policy 2. This can be explained because the food hub needs more 
farmers to satisfy its demand and having large base of farmers is critical because of the low 
negotiation success rate. 
  
  
 
Figure 21: Farmer Distribution Sensitivity Analysis 
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Changing contract length in Policy 3 
The purpose of performing analysis by changing the contract length was to understand the 
impacts this change would have on the RFSC parameters. In this sensitivity analysis, the 
contract length is set as 30 time-steps. Changing the contract length in policy 3 has no 
significant effect on any of the RFSC metrics.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis described a multi-agent simulation model of a theoretical food-producing region 
in which farmers of various sizes negotiate with and sell food to a regional food hub.  This 
model was used to assess the impact of three different supplier selection policies on 
performance and structural metrics of the regional food system, which is an area of 
significant interest to food hub managers and other regional food chain participants.  The use 
of multi-agent simulation to study this problem allowed agent autonomy and heterogeneity to 
be captured, in terms of objectives, attributes, and behavior.  It also enables food hub 
managers to be represented as decision makers who apply multiple different criteria 
(including non-traditional social metrics) in their evaluation of supplier performance, as they 
do in the real world.  
 Among the three different policies analyzed in this model, Policy 2 and Policy 3 
perform much better than Policy 1 overall, although each policy has its own advantages. 
With Policy 3, each selected farmer is able to earn higher profits; however, there are fewer 
farmers selected compared to Policy 2. One of the reasons that the average amount of 
produce sold to food hub (fh_ratio) by small farmers in Policy 2 is similar to Policy 1 is that 
the farmer calculates his sales as per his multi-objective utility value (i.e., if the farmer is 
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satisfied with the current sales, he would not sell more, even if it would mean more profits). 
This is a result of the risk-averse behavior that has been observed in most farmers. However, 
some farmers do achieve a higher fh_ratio (up to 80%). In cases where a small farmer is 
located far away from the food hub, the farmer needs to sell a higher percentage of its 
produce (fh_ratio) to compensate for the transportation cost incurred of delivering produce to 
the food hub. With Policy 3, due to the food hub’s assurance of the contract length and 
volume (fh_ratio), the farmer feels secure in selling his produce. The assurance of food hub 
purchasing a fixed volume of produce for a fixed term, serves as an assurance. This 
assurance helps farmer to trust the food hub and build a healthy relationship. Thus we can 
conclude that Policy 3 helps in overcoming the risk averse behavior of farmers by assuring 
them consistent sales. 
The results of our experiments indicate that food hubs should anticipate that an up-
front investment of time and resources will be necessary to provide adequate assistance to 
smaller-scale farmers to help them meet performance requirements. However, once these 
relationships have been established, food hubs, regional farmers, and consumers can greatly 
benefit from this partnership. For example, to set up a process to measure farmers’ 
performance requires informing all the about the process. In some cases give them training 
on how their performance can be improved. As can be seen from Figure 11 for Policy 3, the 
% of farmers with whom the negotiations are conducted is greater than the other policies for 
first 40 time-steps. However once the process is set, the number of negotiations are then 
significantly less. Outputs from the experiments indicate that consistency of suppliers is key 
for the success of Policy 2 and Policy 3. Since the same farmers are consistently selected in 
77 
 
 
Policy 2 and Policy 3, future research to assess whether coordination among the selected 
farmers could be achieved would be of interest.  
Coordination among selected farmers has the potential to reduce the transportation 
requirements of the individual farmers and benefit the RFSC overall.  .  As can be seen in 
Figure 22, the number of farmers selected more than 95% of the time is 31. Close 
observation indicates small groups of 3-5 farmers tend to emerge that have the potential to 
coordinate among themselves to transport their products to the food hub (see Figure 23). This 
type of coordination could reduce the total transportation (i.e., “food miles”) by one-third. 
Also, as the results of the sensitivity analysis indicate, transportation cost is a critical factor 
for the RFSC. Reductions in transportation costs can help reduce the cost of the food. This 
will help reduce the perception and the generally observed trend of regionally-produced food 
as being expensive compared to the conventional food supply chain. Another potential 
benefit is reduction in emission of greenhouse gases.  
The outcomes of this research can provide guidance to food hub managers as they 
develop their supply chain management policies to support profitable, efficient, and 
sustainable regional food chains.  One limitation of this model is that it only captures the 
production and distribution of a single crop type. It would be interesting to see how the 
agents would perform with multiple crops. Also, the distribution of demand is assumed to be 
static, such that steep growth or decline in demand is not considered. A possible future 
development of the model presented in this thesis is the inclusion of multiple (possibly 
competing) food hubs. In particular, it would be interesting to model multiple food hubs with 
each food hub having different business models and/or sets of objectives.  
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Figure 22: Farmer Selection 
 
 
Figure 23:Policy 2 Farmer Selection and Location 
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This model can be used as a basis for understanding the impacts of supplier selection 
policies in RFSCs and provides a starting point for future experiments that could include 
empirical data from real-life RFSCs and food hubs. For example, food hub managers can 
capture farmers’ performance using a version of a Balanced Scorecard that is tailored to the 
needs of an RFSC (see Appendix for an example of such a tool that is currently being piloted 
by food hubs in Iowa). Overall, the outcomes of the experiments described in this thesis 
match the expectations that are suggested in the RFSC literature,  and their implications have 
the potential to immensely help food hub managers to implement one a selection policy such 
as Policy 2 or Policy 3.  
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CHAPTER 3 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
General Discussion 
This thesis described a multi-agent simulation model of a theoretical food-producing region 
in which farmers of various sizes negotiate with and sell food to a regional food hub.  This 
model was used to assess the impact of three different supplier selection policies on 
performance and structural metrics of the regional food system, which is an area of 
significant interest to food hub managers and other regional food chain participants.  The use 
of multi-agent simulation to study this problem allowed agent autonomy and heterogeneity to 
be captured, in terms of objectives, attributes, and behavior.  It also enables food hub 
managers to be represented as decision makers who apply multiple different criteria 
(including non-traditional social metrics) in their evaluation of supplier performance, as they 
do in the real world.  
 Among the three different policies analyzed in this model, Policy 2 and Policy 3 
perform much better than Policy 1 overall, although each policy has its own advantages. 
With Policy 3, each selected farmer is able to earn higher profits; however, there are fewer 
farmers selected compared to Policy 2. One of the reasons that the average amount of 
produce sold to food hub (fh_ratio) by small farmers in Policy 2 is similar to Policy 1 is that 
the farmer calculates his sales as per his multi-objective utility value (i.e., if the farmer is 
satisfied with the current sales, he would not sell more, even if it would mean more profits). 
This is a result of the risk-averse behavior that has been observed in most farmers. However, 
some farmers do achieve a higher fh_ratio (up to 80%). In cases where a small farmer is 
located far away from the food hub, the farmer needs to sell a higher percentage of its 
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produce (fh_ratio) to compensate for the transportation cost incurred of delivering produce to 
the food hub. With Policy 3, due to the food hub’s assurance of the contract length and 
volume (fh_ratio), the farmer feels secure in selling his produce. The assurance of food hub 
purchasing a fixed volume of produce for a fixed term, serves as an assurance. This 
assurance helps farmer to trust the food hub and build a healthy relationship. Thus we can 
conclude that Policy 3 helps in overcoming the risk averse behavior of farmers by assuring 
them consistent sales. 
 
Recommendation for future work 
 The results of our experiments indicate that food hubs should anticipate that 
an up-front investment of time and resources will be necessary to provide adequate assistance 
to smaller-scale farmers to help them meet performance requirements. However, once these 
relationships have been established, food hubs, regional farmers, and consumers can greatly 
benefit from this partnership. For example, to set up a process to measure farmers’ 
performance requires informing all the about the process. In some cases give them training 
on how their performance can be improved. As can be seen from Figure 11 for Policy 3, the 
% of farmers with whom the negotiations are conducted is greater than the other policies for 
first 40 time-steps. However once the process is set, the number of negotiations are then 
significantly less. Outputs from the experiments indicate that consistency of suppliers is key 
for the success of Policy 2 and Policy 3. Since the same farmers are consistently selected in 
Policy 2 and Policy 3, future research to assess whether coordination among the selected 
farmers could be achieved would be of interest.  
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Coordination among selected farmers has the potential to reduce the transportation 
requirements of the individual farmers and benefit the RFSC overall. As can be seen in 
Figure 22, the number of farmers selected more than 95% of the time is 31. Close 
observation indicates small groups of 3-5 farmers tend to emerge that have the potential to 
coordinate among themselves to transport their products to the food hub (see Figure 23). This 
type of coordination could reduce the total transportation (i.e., “food miles”) by one-third. 
Also, as the results of the sensitivity analysis indicate, transportation cost is a critical factor 
for the RFSC. Reductions in transportation costs can help reduce the cost of the food. This 
will help reduce the perception and the generally observed trend of regionally-produced food 
as being expensive compared to the conventional food supply chain. Another potential 
benefit is reduction in emission of greenhouse gases.  
Limitations of the Study 
The outcomes of this research can provide guidance to food hub managers as they develop 
their supply chain management policies to support profitable, efficient, and sustainable 
regional food chains.  One limitation of this model is that it only captures the production and 
distribution of a single crop type. It would be interesting to see how the agents would 
perform with multiple crops. Also, the distribution of demand is assumed to be static, such 
that steep growth or decline in demand is not considered. A possible future development of 
the model presented in this thesis is the inclusion of multiple (possibly competing) food hubs. 
In particular, it would be interesting to model multiple food hubs with each food hub having 
different business models and/or sets of objectives.  
This model can be used as a basis for understanding the impacts of supplier selection 
policies in RFSCs and provides a starting point for future experiments that could include 
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empirical data from real-life RFSCs and food hubs. For example, food hub managers can 
capture farmers’ performance using a version of a Balanced Scorecard that is tailored to the 
needs of an RFSC (see Appendix for an example of such a tool that is currently being piloted 
by food hubs in Iowa). Overall, the outcomes of the experiments described in this thesis 
match the expectations that are suggested in the RFSC literature and their implications have 
the potential to immensely help food hub managers to implement one a selection policy such 
as Policy 2 or Policy 3.  
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APPENDIX A. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS DATA 
Data of sensitivity analysis in tabular form. 
Delivery 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 67.16667 99.59867 93.18933 
Std Dev 1.662142 0.430467 1.568817 
        
SA 1 66.76933 98.47733 94.70533 
Std Dev 1.975645 1.453962 1.943737 
        
SA 2 67.63467 99.49467 93.67467 
Std Dev 2.398594 0.742008 1.280281 
        
SA 3 67.37467 99.39467 93.58933 
Std Dev 2.496247 0.635484 1.866379 
        
SA 4 66.54533 99.40533 95.364 
Std Dev 2.147145 0.644956 2.184507 
        
SA 5 68.30667 99.71067 90.59067 
Std Dev 2.347862 0.302748 1.338775 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
Negotiation 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 15.86533 11.432 6.946667 
Std Dev 0.936196 2.395858 1.355577 
        
SA 1 17.25067 18.31733 14.644 
Std Dev 0.597007 3.161883 4.561118 
        
SA 2 15.84133 10.696 8.118667 
Std Dev 0.818465 1.896177 1.886063 
        
SA 3 16.11867 11.27867 6.249333 
Std Dev 1.074002 1.375187 0.963718 
        
SA 4 14.24667 11.78 6.585333 
Std Dev 0.615303 2.316261 2.084738 
        
SA 5 18.35333 13.808 6.873333 
Std Dev 1.636452 2.372802 2.061094 
 
Performance 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 83.54% 97.88% 97.81% 
Std Dev 0.77% 0.20% 0.23% 
        
SA 1 83.38% 97.65% 97.70% 
Std Dev 0.76% 0.30% 0.31% 
        
SA 2 83.75% 97.80% 97.92% 
Std Dev 1.15% 0.27% 0.22% 
        
SA 3 82.96% 98.43% 98.61% 
Std Dev 0.75% 0.17% 0.09% 
        
SA 4 83.67% 97.87% 97.95% 
Std Dev 0.70% 0.23% 0.32% 
        
SA 5 83.86% 97.68% 97.60% 
Std Dev 0.71% 0.23% 0.51% 
92 
 
 
Defects 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 4.925333 2.781333 1.849333 
Std Dev 0.285636 0.478359 0.228623 
        
SA 1 4.281333 2.418667 1.856 
Std Dev 0.194385 0.412027 0.374696 
        
SA 2 5.001333 2.084 1.808 
Std Dev 0.427381 0.504089 0.273772 
        
SA 3 4.997333 2.409333 1.704 
Std Dev 0.298725 0.401334 0.229033 
        
SA 4 4.466667 2.736 1.769333 
Std Dev 0.144291 0.508837 0.343061 
        
SA 5 5.885333 3.245333 1.842667 
Std Dev 0.405552 0.345193 0.335242 
 
Food hub profit 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 2896.254 4219.656 4166.106 
Std Dev 229.1847 113.0977 139.8804 
        
SA 1 2962.483 3942.843 4217.789 
Std Dev 245.7015 168.6844 196.9528 
        
SA 2 2978.072 4085.152 4132.398 
Std Dev 320.695 182.2455 194.5683 
        
SA 3 2971.233 4135.651 4265.996 
Std Dev 298.3855 220.6918 181.2612 
        
SA 4 3174.443 4058.186 4294.221 
Std Dev 213.7696 137.7713 187.5049 
        
SA 5 2907.837 4099.323 4230.386 
Std Dev 301.9559 139.9251 138.5932 
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Fh_ratio Small Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 0.339627 0.36292 0.638667 
Std Dev 0.002485 0.02075 0.007387 
        
SA 1 0.500187 0.518107 0.640453 
Std Dev 0.008157 0.021174 0.008277 
        
SA 2 0.338947 0.365467 0.64156 
Std Dev 0.00424 0.037758 0.006256 
        
SA 3 0.336813 0.380813 0.648187 
Std Dev 0.005854 0.024034 0.003154 
        
SA 4 0.341613 0.379253 0.644467 
Std Dev 0.00502 0.016693 0.006841 
        
SA 5 0.33696 0.35728 0.629947 
Std Dev 0.005308 0.020088 0.012475 
 
Fh_ratio Medium farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 0.381573 0.322393 0.445627 
Std Dev 0.007945 0.01939 0.003011 
        
SA 1 0.390307 0.355733 0.44364 
Std Dev 0.000576 0.026759 0.009711 
        
SA 2 0.383187 0.32468 0.443987 
Std Dev 0.006782 0.02441 0.003434 
        
SA 3 0.38132 0.324613 0.448133 
Std Dev 0.004699 0.021814 0.002045 
        
SA 4 0.390387 0.344027 0.44392 
Std Dev 0.000528 0.025289 0.00783 
        
SA 5 0.333933 0.289053 0.444067 
Std Dev 0.019036 0.023077 0.007832 
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Fh_ratio Large Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 0.08032 0.00744 0.016173 
Std Dev 0.0049 0.011333 0.010079 
        
SA 1 0.074307 0.013853 0.02368 
Std Dev 0.004113 0.019802 0.023017 
        
SA 2 0.081827 0.083653 0.087333 
Std Dev 0.003738 0.018576 0.029654 
        
SA 3 0.08312 0.070907 0.019987 
Std Dev 0.005435 0.037685 0.025586 
        
SA 4 0.101133 0.012827 0.007507 
Std Dev 0.005322 0.023976 0.007987 
        
SA 5 0.060147 0.02528 0.00952 
Std Dev 0.003418 0.022361 0.006947 
 
Fh_Ratio Very Large Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 0.080973 0.02064 0.024893 
Std Dev 0.004174 0.028269 0.015599 
        
SA 1 0.07876 0.018253 0.017093 
Std Dev 0.004614 0.038526 0.020043 
        
SA 2 0.08364 0.091133 0.08872 
Std Dev 0.003341 0.002963 0.031654 
        
SA 3 0.0822 0.072347 0.03416 
Std Dev 0.004607 0.038198 0.038012 
        
SA 4 0.106147 0.021493 0.020373 
Std Dev 0.005497 0.038102 0.022517 
        
SA 5 0.060747 0.025227 0.015453 
Std Dev 0.002567 0.027047 0.020174 
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Total Selected farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 52.90 55.73 35.96 
Std Dev 1.30 7.99 3.31 
        
SA 1 45.78 45.68 37.02 
Std Dev 0.68 5.61 5.91 
        
SA 2 53.15 41.93 34.73 
Std Dev 1.22 8.93 5.67 
        
SA 3 53.20 48.52 34.88 
Std Dev 1.00 6.58 3.91 
        
SA 4 49.13 53.79 35.65 
Std Dev 0.57 8.21 6.27 
        
SA 5 60.97 65.33 36.16 
Std Dev 2.17 4.77 6.37 
 
Small Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 41.48 43.58 29.90 
Std Dev 1.19 8.54 3.28 
        
SA 1 35.93 36.13 30.34 
Std Dev 0.67 5.50 6.14 
        
SA 2 41.80 28.01 27.34 
Std Dev 1.23 9.22 6.55 
        
SA 3 41.82 35.73 27.83 
Std Dev 0.92 6.72 4.10 
        
SA 4 38.44 42.42 29.39 
Std Dev 0.61 8.24 6.59 
        
SA 5 47.80 52.26 28.66 
Std Dev 1.70 4.66 7.24 
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Medium Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 8.15 11.75 5.50 
Std Dev 0.16 1.22 0.59 
        
SA 1 7.03 8.98 6.11 
Std Dev 0.18 0.78 0.91 
        
SA 2 8.09 10.49 4.81 
Std Dev 0.16 0.75 1.87 
        
SA 3 8.13 10.63 6.48 
Std Dev 0.17 1.26 1.10 
        
SA 4 7.64 11.00 5.94 
Std Dev 0.10 0.73 0.84 
        
SA 5 9.39 12.00 6.96 
Std Dev 0.32 0.82 1.29 
 
Large Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 1.63 0.12 0.20 
Std Dev 0.14 0.18 0.14 
        
SA 1 1.39 0.20 0.31 
Std Dev 0.10 0.28 0.27 
        
SA 2 1.60 1.47 1.33 
Std Dev 0.10 0.48 0.90 
        
SA 3 1.63 0.96 0.23 
Std Dev 0.10 0.60 0.31 
        
SA 4 1.50 0.15 0.09 
Std Dev 0.12 0.25 0.10 
        
SA 5 1.89 0.56 0.25 
Std Dev 0.14 0.54 0.25 
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Very Large Farmers 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Default 1.64 0.28 0.36 
Std Dev 0.10 0.36 0.32 
        
SA 1 1.42 0.38 0.25 
Std Dev 0.09 0.80 0.25 
        
SA 2 1.65 1.97 1.24 
Std Dev 0.05 0.47 0.65 
        
SA 3 1.62 1.20 0.34 
Std Dev 0.13 0.79 0.39 
        
SA 4 1.55 0.22 0.23 
Std Dev 0.10 0.37 0.24 
        
SA 5 1.89 0.51 0.29 
Std Dev 0.14 0.48 0.36 
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APPENDIX B. USERFORM FOR IOWA FOOD CO-OP 
Userform for Iowa Food Coop Des Moines. The following figures give an overview of how 
the data for farmers is captured using the userform in MS Excel. 
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The following figure gives a dashboard overview of the various important metric for the food 
hub. 
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